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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impacts of a social forestry program in Indonesia, Hutan Kamasyarakatan 
(HKm), based on analysis of a survey of 640 HKm and comparable non-HKm plots in the Sumberjaya 
watershed of southern Sumatra, and of the households operating those plots. The HKm program provides 
groups of farmers with secure-tenure permits to continue farming on state Protection Forest land and in 
exchange for protecting remaining natural forestland, planting multistrata agroforests, and using 
recommended soil and water conservation (SWC) measures on their coffee plantations. Using farmers’ 
perceptions, econometric techniques, and propensity score matching, we investigated the impacts of the 
HKm program on perceived land tenure security, land purchase prices, farmers’ investments in tree 
planting and SWC measures, and plot-level profits.  
A significant fraction of HKm group members are not aware of the program or fully aware of its 
requirements. Although farmers who are aware of the program perceive its strong effects on tenure 
security and land values, we found insignificant impacts on the actual purchase prices of plots. 
Nevertheless, our survey revealed that the HKm program has contributed to increased planting of timber 
and multipurpose trees. We did not find significant impacts on investments in SWC measures or on soil 
fertility management practices. HKm has had mixed impacts on profits, with timber trees reducing 
profitability because timber harvesting is not allowed and multipurpose nontimber trees contributing to 
increased profits.  
The policy implications of these findings are also discussed in the paper. 
Keywords: rewards for environmental services, land tenure contracts, social forestry, Indonesia, 
impact assessment. 
 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the government of Indonesia initiated a new social forestry program called Hutan 
Kamasyarakatan (HKm), which provides farmer groups with permits to continue farming on deforested 
state land designated as Protection Forest (PF) or Production Forest
1 in exchange for sustainable 
management of forests and provision of environmental services by the farmers. This program, enacted as 
part of the Reformasi (reform) policies adopted after the fall of the Suharto government, marked a radical 
departure from previous policies toward agricultural use of state forestland. In the past, farmers were 
forcibly evicted from such lands, and in many cases, the coffee trees they had planted were uprooted. 
Those efforts were largely unsuccessful in providing lasting protection or restoration of forest areas, 
which were subsequently ravaged by fires and illegal encroachments.  
The HKm program is an innovative example of using increased tenure security as a mechanism to 
provide rewards for environmental services. The impacts of this approach on the sustainability of use of 
PF land or on poverty in Indonesia are not yet known. This study assessed those impacts, focusing on a 
case study of HKm implementation in the Sumberjaya watershed of the West Lampung District on the 
island of Sumatra.  
 
                                                      
1 Protection Forest land is state property designated as forestland to protect watershed functions. Production Forest land is 
state forestland used mainly for production of timber or other forest products. The other category of state forestland in Indonesia 
is Conservation Forest land (with a main function of preserving biodiversity and ecosystems); plots in that category are not 
eligible for HKm permits. 2 
 
2.  THE HKM PROGRAM 
The HKm program was established by Decree No. 31/Kpts-II/2001 of the Ministry of Forestry in 2001. 
The objective of the program is to empower local communities to practice sustainable forest management, 
thereby sustaining forest functions and the environment and improving social well-being. Under the 
program, groups of households in local communities may apply for permits for managing state forestland. 
To obtain a permit, a group must establish internal regulations to ensure management of the forest area 
according to prevailing laws; use participatory procedures for decision making, conflict resolution, and 
organizational management; be recognized by the community through the village administrative head; 
and prepare a location plan indicating the area to be managed, protection and cultivation blocks, and the 
period and plan for managing the area.  
Protection blocks are areas where natural forest should be protected and rehabilitated because of 
hydrology or land conservation considerations, such as areas within 500 m of a dam or lake, 200 m from a 
water spring, or 100 m from a riverbank or land with a slope of more than 40 percent. Cultivation blocks 
are areas where intensive forestry and agroforestry activities are allowed, as long as they are done in a 
sustainable manner that preserves and improves the environmental services provided by the area. In a 
protection block, tree cutting and other activities that would open the forest canopy are not allowed, and a 
group of farmers with an HKm permit must maintain and cover the forest floor with vegetation, enrich the 
species of trees producing nontimber forest products in areas needing rehabilitation, and avoid 
construction of roads or other physical infrastructure. In a cultivation block, an HKm-permitted group is 
required to maintain the production potential of wood and nonwood forest products and to avoid activities 
that might cause soil erosion, change the land structure, or otherwise change the natural extent or disturb 
the protection functions of the area. In all areas, groups must protect the area from damage by illegal 
users, fires, livestock, pests, and other threats.  
In West Lampung District, Forest Department officials have interpreted these requirements as 
being satisfied if farmers plant noncoffee trees as part of a multistrata agroforestry system in the 
cultivation block and protect the natural forest in the protection block. A group of farmers with an HKm 
permit is required by the Forest Department to plant at least 400 noncoffee trees per hectare and to use 
appropriate soil and water conservation (SWC) measures in the cultivation block. 
A group can acquire an HKm permit in two stages: first a provisional permit is granted for three 
to five years, after which the group can get a definitive permit valid for up to 25 years and extendable. 
Permits are provided by the district head, after approval of the group’s management plan by the Forest 
Department. A provisional permit is granted to the group leader. For approval of a definitive permit, the 
group must obtain formal legal status as a cooperative and must demonstrate adequate performance of its 
management plan and adherence to regulations during the period of the provisional permit. As of June 
2006, no definitive permits had been issued to any HKm groups in the study site of the Sumberjaya 
watershed, West Lampung District, although the first provisional permits had been granted in 2001. One 
reason for the delay in providing definitive permits was that the Forest Department had not yet approved 
the regulations for granting the permits.  3 
 
3.  THE STUDY SITE: SUMBERJAYA WATERSHED
2 
The Sumberjaya watershed was selected for this study because it is the site of intensive study of prospects 
for approaches by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) to provide rewards for environmental services 
under the multicountry project called Rewarding the Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES), 
and because the HKm program has been implemented there since 2001 with support from ICRAF and 
local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  
The Sumberjaya watershed comprises about 40,000 ha of the Sumberjaya subdistrict of the West 
Lampung District of southern Sumatra (Figure 1). More than 82,000 people live in the subdistrict of 
Sumberjaya, which has a population density of about 150 people per square kilometer. Assuming the 
same population density within the Sumberjaya watershed, an estimated 60,000 people live in this area. 
The watershed is very mountainous, with about 40 percent of the land area classified as Protection Forest 
(PF), 10 percent is in a national park (NP), and the remainder is private land. Nevertheless, only about 10 
percent of the area is forested, because most of the PF and NP land has been deforested. The primary use 
of sloping land (mostly PF and NP land) is for coffee production,
3 while paddy is the main use of flatter 
lands at lower elevations (private land). Other land uses include shrub or fallow land and other annual 
crops besides rice, such as vegetables. 



















Source: ICRAF GIS unit, Bogor. 
                                                      
2 This section draws heavily from the description provided in Kerr et al. (2006). 
3 Because of the watershed’s low altitude, Sumberjaya farmers grow low-grade Robusta coffee varieties. 4 
 
Sumberjaya has been inhabited since about 1884, when Sumendo people from nearby areas of 
present-day Lampung Province first settled in the area and practiced shifting cultivation. The 
development of Sumberjaya started in 1951 with the national transmigration program, in which people 
from the densely settled island of Java were moved to various islands. Sumberjaya’s three main ethnic 
groups are Javanese and Sundanese (both from Java) and Sumendo (from southern Sumatra). Migrants 
often follow their ethnic kin, and many villages are mostly ethnically homogeneous, but others are more 
mixed.  
In the 1980s, as coffee prices rose, coffee plantations spread to PF and NP areas in the watershed. 
In the early 1990s, the government of Indonesia, under the former president Suharto, forcibly evicted 
people from much of the PF area. This action coincided with the construction of a small hydroelectric 
plant in the river at the outlet of the watershed and aligned with the perception that agriculture in the 
upper watershed would cause problems for the hydroelectric plant. The key fears were that agriculture 
would reduce the flow of water available for the plant and cause siltation that could damage the turbines.
4 
The evicted local people retaliated by burning the remaining vegetation.  
In the late 1990s, the convergence of several factors led settlers to return to the areas from which 
they had been evicted. The Asian financial crisis left many people jobless, the world price of coffee rose 
sharply in reaction to production problems in Brazil, and the Suharto government fell, replaced by a new, 
reform-oriented government. The new government introduced a program of Reformasi (reform), which 
aimed to be more decentralized and people friendly. The HKm program was subsequently adopted to 
encourage greater security and empowerment of local communities like the farmers of Sumberjaya in 
managing forestlands. 
To date, the area permitted under HKm is very small. The first permits in West Lampung District 
were granted in 2001 in Sumberjaya; around 10 permits are now in force (6 in Sumberjaya), with others 
under negotiation. Out of about 40,000 to 50,000 ha of eligible state forestland in the district, as of June 
2006 only about 2,000 ha were under HKm permits, with an additional 13,000 ha in Sumberjaya included 
in HKm permit applications in process. Nationwide, the total area under HKm permits was only 50,644 
ha as of June 2006. 
The HKm process is more advanced in Sumberjaya than in other areas, most likely because of the 
involvement of ICRAF, which received a grant to help promote the program and support negotiations 
between communities and government through the RUPES program.  
                                                      
4 Recent ICRAF research suggests that both of these fears were misplaced. First, agricultural land yields more water 
downstream through runoff and subsurface flow than does natural forestland; second, filtering effects in the landscape mean that 
erosion in the upper reaches does not necessarily reach the river. Silt in the river originates largely from land use in the lowlands 
closer to the river and from erosion of unpaved roads in the watershed. Ironically, the government’s action most likely increased 
erosion, because ICRAF’s research suggests that well-established coffee plantations do not erode much (M. van Noordwijk, 
ICRAF, pers. comm., November 2004; Van Noordwijk et al. 2004). 5 
 
4.  RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
Data Sources 
We investigated the impacts of the HKm program in Sumberjaya watershed using data collected from 
community, group, and household interviews. Community- and group-level interviews were conducted 
with village leaders and other village representatives using a semistructured, mostly qualitative format. 
The interviews focused on the processes that determine how communities learn about the program, form 
into the groups that are required to apply for the program, go through the application process, obtain the 
permit, and carry out their responsibilities. Another focus of the interviews was the expected impacts of 
the program. 
The community-level survey was conducted in all the villages in the Sumberjaya watershed 
where forest has been classified as Protection Forest (21 of the 29 villages in the watershed). The group 
survey was conducted with all the groups that have obtained HKm permits or are applying for HKm 
permits, and subgroups within the HKm groups. By the time of the survey in 2005, 29 groups had formed 
for HKm permits, of which 6 had obtained permits, 2 had formally applied, 9 had begun preparing 
applications but had not yet submitted them, and 12 were just beginning the application process.  
The household survey was conducted with operators of plots randomly selected using an area-
based sample frame that included eight strata (Figure 2):  
•  Private land 
•  NP land 
•  PF land with an HKm permit (with and without past evictions) 
•  PF land with an HKm permit application in process (with and without past evictions) 
•  PF land eligible for HKm where no application has been made (with and without past 
evictions) 
Separate strata were included for private and NP land, for HKm land with a permit or where a 
permit was in process, and for PF land with or without past evictions, because those scenarios could result 
in differences in tenure security and hence in farmers’ incentive and ability to invest in planting trees and 
in SWC measures. We expected private land to be the most secure and NP land to be the least secure. 
Land without a past eviction was expected to be more secure than land with a past eviction. We expected 
land with an HKm permit to be more secure than land with a permit in process, which we expected to be 
more secure than PF land where no application for a permit had been made. 6 
 
Figure 2. Strata for household and lot survey 
 
Source: ICRAF GIS unit, Bogor. 
In all cases, only cultivated or shrub land in sloping areas was included in the sample frame; no 
paddy or natural forestland was included. Eighty points were randomly selected from each stratum, and 
the plot including those points was identified by key informants. The operator of that plot was 
interviewed using a household survey, which collected information on household demographic 
composition, education, assets, and participation in HKm and other programs and organizations. For the 
selected plots and one other randomly selected plot (where applicable), information was collected on tree 
planting and cutting on the survey plots, investments in SWC measures, use of land management 
practices, and inputs and production.
5 In addition, we took measurements on the selected plots of various 
plot characteristics, including area, altitude, slope, slope length, position on the slope, topsoil depth, soil 
color, soil texture, and distance of the plot to the farmers’ residence and to the nearest road. 
                                                      
5 The randomly selected second plot did not necessarily have the same tenure status as the sampled plot. 7 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for the analysis draws on the framework of Feder et al. (1988) regarding the 
impacts of increased tenure security on land investments, augmented to consider the investment 
requirements of the HKm program. The framework is illustrated in Figure 3. The HKm program can 
increase farmers’ incentive to invest in land improvements (e.g., planting trees, constructing SWC 
structures) through several mechanisms. It can increase farmers’ incentive to invest in PF land by 
increasing their tenure security (linkages 1 and 4 in Figure 3). By increasing tenure security, the value of 
PF land can increase, which can further increase farmers’ investment incentives (linkages 3 and 5) by 
increasing the return to such investments (if the value of such investments is capitalized into land 
values).
6 To the extent that farmers’ incentives to invest are increased, both prescribed investments (e.g., 
planting noncoffee trees, SWC measures) and nonprescribed investments (e.g., planting coffee trees, use 
of compost and fertilizer) can increase (linkages 6 and 7). In addition, the requirements of the HKm 
program, if enforced, can increase prescribed investments (linkages 2 and 8). The impact of these 
increased investments, if such investments are profitable to farmers, should be to increase farmers’ 
production, profits, and income, as well as providing environmental services (linkages 9 and 10).  
Analysis 
Assessment of the impacts of the HKm program was based on this conceptual framework. We 
investigated the different linkages in the impact pathway analysis using descriptive analysis of farmers’ 
perceptions as well as econometric analysis, controlling for various potentially confounding factors. 
Exploration of this full set of relationships helped to draw more-robust conclusions about the extent and 
mechanisms of impact than would otherwise be possible. For example, while the effects of the HKm 
program on land investments could have been assessed using only econometric analysis of the 
determinants of such investments, it might have been difficult to tell from such analysis whether any 
impacts found resulted from the increased tenure security provided by the program or the requirements of 
the program. By also investigating the impacts of the program on perceived tenure security, we gained a 
better understanding of the mechanisms of impact (or nonimpact), and we could validate them by 
assessing impacts on land values, which should have increased if tenure security was improved. Further, 
by investigating impacts on both prescribed and nonprescribed investments and land management 
practices, we obtained a more complete sense of the impacts of the program and the extent to which the 
investment requirements of the program are responsible. 
                                                      
6 We did not consider the impact of increased tenure security on the collateral value of land and farmers’ access to credit, as 
in Feder et al.’s framework, because PF land cannot be used as collateral for loans.  8 
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We explored these linkages first by considering farmers’ awareness and perceptions of the HKm 
program. If members of an HKm group are unaware of the program or its requirements or do not think it 
increases their tenure security, their investment behavior is not likely to be influenced by the program. We 
then investigated the extent to which they think it affects land values, as well as assessing impacts on 
actual land sale values using an econometric hedonic land price regression. If land prices are not affected 
by the program, our confidence that the program actually increases tenure security is reduced, even if 
respondents report that they perceive increased tenure security. We assessed the impacts of the program 
on prescribed investments and nonprescribed investments and land management practices and on profits 
using econometric regressions and propensity score matching. We also investigated the potential 
distributional impacts of the program by analyzing the characteristics of both participants and 
nonparticipants in the program. Impacts on sustainability of resource use and environmental indicators 
were assessed in other research. 




5.  RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss the results of the community and household surveys with regard to the issues 
highlighted in the conceptual framework, using both simple descriptive statistics and econometric 
analysis. We review our findings on the characteristics of farmers participating in the HKm program; their 
awareness of the program and its requirements; and the impacts of the program on tenure security, land 
values, investments in tree planting, SWC measures and other land management practices, and profits at 
the plot level. 
Potential Impacts on Poverty: Who Participates in HKm? 
Operators of plots with HKm permits or HKm applications pending tend to be poorer than owners of 
private land. For example, in 2000, the mean value of land owned by operators of HKm permit plots was 
about 23 million Rupiah (mostly coffee land), and the mean value of land owned by operators of plots 
with HKm applications pending was 18 million Rupiah compared with a mean value of 42 million Rupiah 
for owners of private plots (Table 1). The value of buildings, equipment, and livestock owned was also 
substantially larger for owners of private plots. 
Although poorer than owners of private plots, operators of HKm plots have comparable wealth to 
that of operators of PF plots who have not applied for HKm permits and operators of NP land. Thus, the 
HKm program appears to target poorer households because of the nature of the households using PF land, 
while differences in wealth among such households appear not to be responsible for determining who 
obtained access to the program by 2005. We discuss this hypothesis further later in the report. 
With regard to other household characteristics, operators of HKm permit plots are more often 
Sundanese and less often Sumendo than operators of other plots. Operators of plots with HKm 
applications pending are of similar ethnic distribution as operators of PF plots who have not applied for 
HKm permits and operators of private plots, whereas operators of NP plots are much more likely to be 
Javanese than are operators of other plots. Apparently, Javanese immigrants have settled more in parts of 
the watershed bordering the national park.  
Owners of private plots are slightly older than operators of other types of plots. Their families are 
of similar size to those of operators of most other plots, but their households have a slightly lower 
dependency ratio on average. Both male and female education is highest on average for operators of HKm 
permit plots and lowest for operators of NP plots, suggesting that education may have contributed to the 
ability of HKm permit holders to obtain permits sooner than other PF land users. Owners of private plots, 
not surprisingly, have lived in their villages longer than owners of other plots, while operators of PF plots 
who have not applied for HKm permits have been settled the shortest amount of time. Differences in the 
average period of settlement across these groups are not very large, however (ranging from 16 years for 
private plot owners to 11 years for operators of PF plots without an HKm permit or application pending 
(referred to in Table 1 and subsequently in this report as “PF plots [or land] without HKm”). 
Differences in social capital are associated with differences in tenure status. Owners of private 
plots and operators of HKm permit plots are mostly likely to belong to coffee producers’ groups, while 
none of the operators using PF land without HKm or NP land belongs to such groups. HKm permit 
holders are also most likely to be involved in labor-sharing groups. 
Access to markets and roads also differs across plot types. Owners of private plots and operators 
of HKm permit plots live closer to the nearest output market than do operators of other plots, and 
operators of NP plots live much further than all other categories. Consistent with this, private and HKm 
permit plots tend to be much closer to the nearest road, and NP plots and PF plots without HKm are much 
further from roads. By contrast, NP plots are closer to the operator’s residence than other plots.  
Access to formal credit and technical assistance also differs across these groups. Owners of 
private plots are much more likely to have access to formal credit than operators of other types of plots. 
Access to technical assistance from the Forest Department is greatest for operators of HKm permit plots, 
followed by operators of plots with HKm applications pending and then operators of PF plots without 11 
 
HKm. Not surprisingly, technical assistance from the Forest Department is least common for operators of 
NP plots, because such land is not supposed to be used, even for tree planting. Technical assistance from 
the Agriculture Department is most common for owners of private plots, followed by operators of HKm 
permit plots, plots with HKm applications pending, and PF plots without HKm. Technical assistance from 
ICRAF and NGOs is most common for operators of plots with HKm permits or HKm applications 
pending. These findings suggest that access to technical assistance from the Forest Department, ICRAF, 
or NGOs may be an important determinant of a household’s ability to obtain an HKm permit. 
Also evident across plot tenure types are differences in how the plots were acquired and in their 
quality. Purchasing is the most common way that current operators acquired access to plots of all tenure 
types but especially for NP and private plots. Inheritance is the second most common means of plot 
acquisition, except for NP plots, which have been occupied more recently than others. Encroachment is 
most common for PF plots with HKm applications pending or without HKm, and sharecropping is more 
common for PF plots without HKm than for other tenure types.12 
Table 1. Characteristics of users and plots of various tenures 
Variable 
National Park  Private  HKm Permit  HKm Application 
Pending  PF Land without HKm 
Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error 
Tenure status in 2000            
Past  evictions            
- Whether an eviction 
occurred 
0  0  0.101 0.034 0.316 0.041 0.236 0.034 0.114 0.021 
- Whether trees were 
uprooted 
0  0  0.025 0.018 0.102 0.029 0.150 0.030 0.081 0.019 
How  plot  acquired              
-  Encroached    0.063 0.027  0.05 0.025 0.070 0.021 0.150 0.029 0.113 0.026 
-  Inherited  0.052 0.025 0.203 0.046 0.153 0.034 0.132 0.029 0.148 0.030 
-  Purchased  0.494 0.057 0.392 0.055 0.338 0.041 0.386 0.040 0.299 0.038 
-  Sharecropped  0.065 0.028 0.063 0.028 0.055 0.016 0.010 0.007 0.134 0.010 
-  Exchanged  0.039 0.022 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.006  0  0  0.027 0.014 
Plot characteristics            
Area  (ha)  1.324 0.082 1.033 0.093 0.990 0.062 1.038 0.059 1.185 0.773 
Soil  color            
-  Yellow  0.156 0.042 0.139 0.039 0.130 0.029 0.118 0.026 0.102 0.026 
-  Red  0.390 0.056 0.266 0.050 0.305 0.041 0.189 0.033 0.178 0.029 
-  Brown  0.156 0.042 0.165 0.042 0.204 0.034 0.275 0.035 0.355 0.040 
-  Black  0.275 0.050 0.438 0.056 0.272 0.038 0.367 0.039 0.309 0.037 
Soil  texture            
-  Clay  0.390 0.056 0.354 0.054 0.454 0.044 0.359 0.039 0.334 0.036 
-  Sandy  0.182 0.044 0.152 0.041 0.089 0.025 0.099 0.023 0.113 0.026 
-  Loam  0.400 0.055 0.488 0.056 0.360 0.040 0.486 0.040 0.484 0.038 13 
 
Table 1. Continued 
Variable 
National Park  Private  HKm Permit  HKm Application 
Pending  PF Land without HKm 
Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error 
Altitude  (m)  1100  10.165  888.430 9.705  1001.702 3.848  980.841 6.501  1048.214 6.477 
Slope  (%)  48.824 2.335  31.430 2.228  43.211 1.739  45.199 1.733  43.482 1.657 
Soil  depth  (cm)  15.682 0.743  14.908 0.674  13.807 0.493  14.342 0.596  14.492 0.500 
Position  on  slope            
-  Top  0.416 0.057 0.266 0.050 0.227 0.038 0.145 0.030 0.212 0.034 
-  Middle  0.416 0.057 0.278 0.051 0.426 0.042 0.561 0.039 0.620 0.039 
-  Top/middle/bottom  0.078 0.031 0.051 0.025 0.041 0.019 0.015 0.009 0.019 0.011 
-  Bottom  0.1 0.034  0.4 0.055 0.313 0.040 0.279 0.036 0.148 0.026 
Fallow/shrub plot in 
2000 
0.039 0.022 0.025 0.018 0.172 0.034 0.139 0.029 0.169 0.032 
Stock of trees in 2000 
(no./ha) 
          
-  Timber  3.289 1.711  25.631 7.632  143.115 32.040 80.249 14.221 52.572 11.903 
- Multipurpose  16.951  3.359  80.044  15.470  188.103 36.324 91.750 13.615 55.183  7.542 
-  Shade  118.513 20.562  303.013 66.199  272.969 40.910  323.726 72.938  150.567 21.406 
-  Coffee  2268.434 206.048 3236.59 280.368  3547.664 444.310 3032.06 207.659 2639.53 197.284 
Plot  cleared  by  2000  0.013 0.013  0  0  0.032 0.016 0.051 0.018 0.013 0.010 
Walking time from 
residence (min) 
17.000 4.092  29.900 4.823  29.570 2.389  41.599 4.105  43.277 4.291 
Walking time from road 
(min) 
85.312 6.764  32.950 4.222  35.851 1.875  55.157 3.593  70.996 4.000 
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Table 1. Continued 
Variable 
National Park  Private  HKm Permit  HKm Application 
Pending  PF Land without HKm 
Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error 
Household 
characteristics in 2000 
          
Value of assets (millions 
of Rupiah) 
          
-  Rice  land  6.117 1.858 8.442 3.435 6.953 2.497 3.272 0.966 7.144 2.034 
- Coffee land  14.149  1.950  32.351  4.886  13.917 1.782  14.612 2.810  10.901 1.620 
-  Other  land  2.208 0.671 1.373 0.541 2.120 0.986 0.536 0.155 2.401 0.925 
-  Livestock  0.266 0.126 0.613 0.248 0.029 0.014 0.062 0.027 0.053 0.020 
-  Farm  equipment    0.214 0.077 0.315 0.112 0.223 0.075 0.152 0.063 0.122 0.044 
-  Transport  equipment  1.239 0.303 2.472 0.598 1.795 0.446 1.214 0.382 3.343 0.932 
-  Buildings  17.265 2.808  22.239 3.527  13.085 2.301  15.376 2.238  14.248 2.148 
Ethnicity              
-  Sumendo  0.113 0.036 0.188 0.044 0.104 0.026 0.260 0.036 0.245 0.035 
-  Javanese  0.753 0.049 0.354 0.054 0.406 0.037 0.401 0.039 0.359 0.039 
-  Sundanese  0.143 0.040 0.392 0.055 0.468 0.040 0.321 0.039 0.335 0.035 
Age of the household 
head 
38.143 1.343  40.620 1.414  38.709 1.143  38.165 1.032  37.077 1.029 
Dependency  ratio  0.362 0.027 0.347 0.025 0.362 0.020 0.370 0.019 0.363 0.018 
Years of education of 
males 
5.280 0.321 6.086 0.345 6.711 0.262 6.188 0.233 6.423 0.251 
Years of education of 
females 
4.883 0.323 5.553 0.378 6.062 0.255 5.540 0.243 5.536 0.235 
Primary occupation of 
household head 
          
-  Agricultural  0.975 0.018 0.963 0.021 0.940 0.022 0.970 0.014 0.935 0.020 15 
 
Table 1. Continued 
Variable 
National Park  Private  HKm Permit  HKm Application 
Pending  PF Land without HKm 
Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error Mean Std.  error 
-  Nonagricultural  0.013 0.013 0.038 0.022 0.046 0.020 0.023 0.012 0.054 0.019 
Male  household  head  0.987 0.013 0.949 0.025 0.950 0.020 0.974 0.013 0.992 0.008 
Female share of labor 
supply 
42.597 2.067  45.865 2.020  46.963 1.630  45.300 1.439  43.611 1.477 
Family  size  3.636 0.198 3.608 0.162 3.341 0.112 3.777 0.136 3.575 0.110 
Years household settled 
in village 
12.909 1.182  16.278 1.765  13.930 1.413  12.079 1.190  10.963 1.016 
Participation  in  groups            
- Coffee producers’ 
group 
0  0  0.076 0.030 0.074 0.025 0.013 0.009  0  0 
-  Labor-sharing  group  0.091 0.033 0.051 0.025 0.132 0.031 0.046 0.018 0.024 0.014 
Distance to output 
market (km) 
8.642 0.762 1.445 0.224 1.675 0.144 2.567 0.246 2.806 0.252 
Access  to  formal  credit  0.403 0.056 0.722 0.051 0.408 0.044 0.422 0.040 0.366 0.039 
Access to technical 
assistance 
          
-  ICRAF  0.000 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.065 0.024 0.065 0.021 0.000 0.000 
-  Forest  Department  0.026 0.018 0.089 0.032 0.422 0.044 0.253 0.036 0.145 0.030 
-  Agriculture  Department 0.013 0.013 0.139 0.039 0.099 0.026 0.063 0.021 0.054 0.018 
- Nongovernmental 
organization 
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.106 0.028 0.058 0.019 0.007 0.007 
Source: Plot and household survey. 
Note: ICRAF = World Agroforestry Centre. 16 
Past evictions have affected nearly one-third of plots with HKm permits and smaller shares of 
plots with HKm applications pending or without HKm. Apparently, the experience of past evictions has 
encouraged the recipients of HKm permits to apply earlier than other land users. Nevertheless, the 
experience of having trees uprooted in a prior eviction is most common on plots with an HKm application 
pending. Surprisingly, past evictions were reported on 10 percent of plots classified as private. This may 
reflect lack of agreement between farmers and the government about which plots are actually private 
plots.  
NP plots tend to be somewhat larger than plots of other tenure types, while differences among the 
other types are relatively small. Private plots are more likely than other tenure types to have black soil, 
whereas NP plots are most likely to have red or yellow soils. HKm permit plots are most likely to have 
clay soils, while private plots and PF plots with HKm applications pending or no applications are most 
likely to have loamy soils, and sandy soils are most common on NP plots. Private plots tend to be at lower 
elevations than other plots, whereas NP plots and PF plots without HKm tend to be at somewhat higher 
elevations. NP plots are the steepest on average (average slope nearly 50 percent); private plots are the 
least steep although still fairly steep (average slope more than 30 percent). Across tenure categories, most 
of the sample plots are on the top or middle of a slope, although a greater proportion of NP plots are at the 
top while a greater proportion of private plots are at the bottom of a slope. Differences among the tenure 
categories in topsoil depth are relatively small (around 14 to 16 cm for all categories). In 2000, PF plots 
(with or without HKm) were more likely to be fallow or shrub plots than private or NP plots. The density 
of coffee trees in 2000 was greatest on plots that are now HKm permit plots and on private plots, and 
lowest on NP plots. 
These results suggest that access to the HKm program may be influenced by the human and social 
capital, access to markets, and access to technical assistance of households and communities. Households’ 
incentives to apply for HKm permits may also be influenced by their past experience of evictions. Land 
quality differs among the various tenure categories, with NP and PF plots generally on steeper slopes at 
higher elevations than private plots. Initial conditions also differ among the tenure types, with PF plots 
more likely to have been fallow or shrub plots before HKm than private or NP plots, whereas the average 
number of coffee trees in 2000 was highest on HKm permit plots. It is not clear whether the quality of 
soils on private plots or any other tenure category is generally superior to the other categories. Later in the 
report, we test for the impacts of such differences in determining HKm permit status and control for such 
differences in testing for the impacts of HKm.  
Awareness of HKm 
Respondents’ awareness of the HKm status of their plots (for those plots with either verified HKm 
permits or HKm applications in process) is reported in Table 2. Among the surveyed operators of plots 
with HKm permits, nearly 20 percent said they were not aware of the permits. The proportion is slightly 
higher for operators of HKm plots where no evictions had occurred in the past, possibly because those 
operators are less concerned about tenure insecurity and hence may feel less need to inform themselves 
about the HKm program. Consistent with this, we also found that among operators of plots for which 
HKm permit applications were pending, a larger proportion of operators said they were unaware of the 
applications if no past evictions had occurred on their plots than if evictions had occurred on their plots. 
In both cases, however, more than 50 percent of the operators expressed lack of awareness of the HKm 
applications. 
These results are consistent with findings of the HKm group survey reported by Kerr et al. 
(2006), which shows that many HKm applicants and permit holders are not fully aware of the program or 
its requirements. That survey found that although nearly all groups were aware of requirements to protect 
remaining natural forest, more than half of the groups that had applied for HKm permits were unaware of 
the composition of trees required to be planted by the program in production areas, and a significant 
fraction were not aware of SWC requirements. Awareness of the requirements was substantially higher 17 
 
among groups that actually have HKm permits, although a few groups were not fully aware of the tree 
composition and SWC requirements.  
These findings (both those previously reported here and those of Kerr et al. [2006]) suggest two 
things. First, the group-based nature of HKm permits means that even farmers who do not understand the 
program can join it and perhaps benefit from a mechanism for granting rewards for environmental 
services. This is in contrast to programs based on the participation of individuals who must be informed 
to benefit. Well-connected landowners are more likely to access individual-based programs, but the group 
nature of the HKm program and its reward of tenure security as opposed to cash mean that their less well-
informed neighbors can share in the benefits.  
On the other hand, lack of program awareness suggests that information dissemination within 
HKm groups is inadequate, especially before a group receives its permit. Land users are much better 
informed about HKm once their group has a permit, but still a significant proportion are unaware of the 
program. Such lack of awareness can undermine achievement of the objectives of the program but could 
be addressed fairly straightforwardly through increased informational efforts. 
Table 2. Awareness of HKm Program 
Variable 
With Past Eviction  Without Past Eviction  All HKm Plots 
Mean  Std. 
error 
N  Mean  Std. 
error 
N  Mean  Std. 
error 
N 
Percentage of operators of 
HKm permit plots not aware 
of permits 
17.3  4.2 80  24.1  4.8 80  19.4  3.3  160 
Percentage of operators of 
plots with HKm applications 
not aware of applications  
57.5  5.6 80  80.0  4.5 80  66.2  3.8  160 
Source: Household survey. 
Impacts on Tenure Security 
Respondents in the community survey reported their perceptions concerning the security of tenure on PF 
land, expressed as a percentage of the security of private land before and after the Reformasi began and at 
present with or without an HKm permit (Figure 4). Their responses suggest that both the Reformasi and 
the HKm program have had substantial positive impacts on perceived tenure security on PF land, with 
security increasing from less than 20 percent before the Reformasi to 30–40 percent immediately after the 
Reformasi period began and rising to more than 40 percent by 2005 if applying for an HKm permit, 70–
80 percent with a provisional (5-year) permit, and nearly 90 percent (hypothetically) if a definitive (25-
year) permit were granted.  
Similar results were found in the household survey, in which only operators of plots with HKm 
permits were asked to rate tenure security of those plots (Table 3). According to respondents’ perceptions, 
both the Reformasi and the HKm program have had a major impact in increasing tenure security on PF 
land, with an average increase in perceived security of 20 percentage points after the Reformasi and an 
additional 26 percentage points after provisional HKm permits were obtained. The perceived impacts of 
the Reformasi and the HKm program were much larger on plots where there had been evictions in the 
past, with perceived tenure security much lower on those plots before the Reformasi. 
These results suggest that the HKm program has had a major impact on the tenure security of 
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Figure 4. Perceived tenure security on protection forest land relative to private land (tenure 

























Source: Community survey 
Table 3. Perceived tenure security of HKm permit plots (% of security on private land) 
Variable 
With Past Eviction  Without Past 
Eviction 
All HKm Permit 
Plots 
Mean  Std. 
error  N  Mean  Std. 
error  N  Mean  Std. 
error  N 
Tenure security before 
Reformasi 
19.6 2.5  46  45.2 2.0  46  27.5 1.8  92 
Tenure security after Reformasi  44.9 2.6  56  53.9 1.9  53  47.7 1.9  109 
Tenure security after HKm 
permit 
75.5 2.1  62  71.1 1.7  61  74.1 1.6  123 
Change in tenure security 
because of Reformasi 
25.3 3.2  46 8.7 1.7  46  20.2 2.2  92 
Change in tenure security 
because of HKm 
30.6 2.8  56  17.2 1.8  53  26.4 2.0  109 
Source: Household survey 19 
 
Impacts on Land Values 
Consistent with their perceptions about impacts of the Reformasi and the HKm program on tenure 
security, respondents to the community survey said they believe that values of PF land increased 
dramatically after the Reformasi period began in 1998. Although prices had fallen by 2005 for PF land 
without HKm permits (probably due largely to the decline in coffee prices between 1998 and 2005), 
expected prices in 2005 were substantially higher for plots with HKm permits (Figure 5). If a plot had 
(hypothetically) received a definitive 25-year permit, the expected price was about double the price 
without an HKm permit. 
Data from the household survey on the actual purchase prices of plots acquired through purchase 
tell a more mixed story. PF plots purchased since 1998 have an average price about one-fourth that of 
private plots purchased during that period, while the price of plots with HKm permits is slightly higher 
than PF plots without permits (Table 4). Surprisingly, however, the average price of PF plots is even 
lower than that of NP plots purchased since 1998 (possibly reflecting greater likelihood that NP plots had 
coffee planted on them, as noted previously). These results are less supportive of the view that tenure 
security has increased dramatically as a result of the HKm program, although they suggest some positive 
impact of the program on land tenure security and hence land prices. However, part of the discrepancy 
may be the result of differences in the quality of purchased PF plots relative to other purchased plots, or in 
the presence of coffee or other valuable trees on the plots at the time of purchase. Further, the impact of 
an HKm permit on land values at the time of plot purchases may have been less than the impact after 
people became more familiar with the program. To address those issues, we used a hedonic regression to 
control for other factors expected to affect the price of land. 
Table 4. Price of plots purchased since 1998 (millions of Rupiah/ha) 
Land type  Mean  Standard error  Number of 
observations 
Private 14.90  2.21  8 
National park  4.69  0.76  19 
PF land with HKm at time of purchase  3.89  0.66  33 
PF land without HKm at time of purchase  3.19  0.37  139 
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Source: Community survey. 
Econometric Model for Land Prices 
The regression specification for determinants of land prices is as follows: 
  0 ln( ) ln( )
P
pt t T pt X pt pt Pt T X u ββ β β =+ + + + , (1) 
where Ppt is the purchase price of plot p purchased in year t; Tpt is a vector of dummy variables reflecting 
the tenure and HKm status of the plot at the time of purchase; Xpt is a vector of quality characteristics of 
the plot; β0, βt, βT, and βX are vectors of parameters to be estimated; and u
P
pt is an error term reflecting 
unobserved factors affecting land prices. The tenure variables (Tpt) include whether the plot was private, 
NP, or PF land with an HKm permit at the time of purchase (PF land without an HKm permit is the 
excluded category), whether there were any evictions from the plot in the past, and if so whether trees 
were uprooted. The plot quality characteristics (Xpt) include the area and average altitude and slope of the 
plot; the position of the plot on the slope (whether on the top, middle, or bottom of the slope or some 
combination); the topsoil color (black, brown, red, or yellow), texture (clay, loam, sandy, or some 
combination), and depth; the access of the plot to the village center, to the farmer’s residence, and to 
roads and pathways (walking time to each); and the types of trees on the plot at the time of purchase 
(mature coffee monoculture, mature coffee with shade trees, mature coffee with timber trees, mature 
coffee with fruit trees, mature coffee in a mixed multistrata agroforestry system, young [preharvest] 
coffee, defective [unhealthy] coffee, or bushes or shrubs). Logarithmic transformations of all continuous 
explanatory variables were used (year of purchase; plot area; mean altitude and slope; soil depth; and 21 
 
walking time to the village, residence, road, and footpath), thereby reducing problems of nonlinearity in 
residuals and outliers (Mukherjee et al. 1998). 
We hypothesized that HKm permit plots are worth less than private plots, more than PF plots 
without HKm permits, and more than NP plots as a result of having less tenure security than private plots 
but more security than either PF land without HKm permits or NP land. Past evictions and uprooting of 
trees during evictions may reduce the value of land by increasing the perception of tenure insecurity. 
Irrespective of its impacts on tenure security, uprooting of trees also can reduce the value of land by 
reducing the stock of valuable trees, though this should be reflected in the effects of the tree stocks. We 
expected that plots with mature, healthy coffee trees to be more valuable than plots with young coffee 
trees, defective coffee trees, or bush and shrubs. Other plot quality characteristics, such as altitude, slope, 
and soil type, may affect land quality to the extent that those characteristics affect the productivity of the 
plot. Another hypothesis is that better access of the plot to the town, roads, and the farmer’s residence 
increase plot value. 
We used three regression models: ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, OLS including 
village-level fixed effects (FE), and instrumental variables (IV) estimation. OLS estimation may be 
subject to bias if the error term is correlated with any of the explanatory variables, perhaps because of 
omitted variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables or because some of the explanatory 
variables may be endogenous (particularly the HKm status of the plot, which may be correlated with 
unobserved village, household, or plot characteristics). The potential problem of omitted-variable bias 
was addressed by including village-level fixed effects (allowing for a different intercept in each village
7), 
which controls for any unobserved factors that differ across (but not within) villages. The potential 
endogeneity problem was addressed by estimating an IV model, instrumenting for the HKm permit status 
of the plot. We could not estimate the IV model with village-level fixed effects because all the 
instrumental variables are village-level variables. However, using village-level fixed effects helps to 
control for components of the error term that could be correlated with the endogenous regressor, thus 
helping to address any endogeneity bias.  
The instrumental variables used to predict the HKm status, in addition to the other plot quality 
characteristics, included several village-level indicators of bridging social capital collected in the 
community survey: whether a Forest Department official lives in the village, whether anyone in the 
village has friends in the Forest Department, whether other government officials live in the village, 
whether anyone in the village is friends with anyone from Watala (an NGO providing promotion and 
technical assistance for the HKm program), whether anyone in the village works for any other NGO, or 
whether anyone in the village is friends with someone from any other NGO. These indicators of bridging 
social capital were selected as instrumental variables because they are associated with participation in the 
HKm program (Kerr et al. 2006) but are not expected to affect land values directly, controlling for 
participation in the HKm program and plot quality characteristics. 
Econometric Results 
The regression results are reported in Table 5. The OLS model fits the data well, explaining 69 percent of 
the variance in land values. A test for nonlinearity in the regression residuals (the Ramsey RESET test
8) 
did not reveal any significant problem, and inspection of the graph of the residuals versus fitted values 
supports that finding.
9 The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) for the explanatory variables is 6.6, 
and the rest are less than 5, indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem in this regression 
(Mukherjee et al. 1998).  
                                                      
7 In that case, βo is a vector of estimated village-specific intercepts rather than a single intercept. 
8 This test is sometimes referred to as a test for omitted variable bias but is more accurately described as a test of 
nonlinearities because it involves testing whether polynomial powers of the fitted values significantly explain variation in the 
residuals. 
9 By contrast, a linear version of the model (using untransformed versions of the dependent and continuous explanatory 
variables) showed serious nonlinearity in the residuals and failed the Ramsey RESET test. 22 
 
In the FE model, the explanatory power is significantly greater (explaining 79 percent of the 
variance), and a Wald test for the joint significance of the village effects (not reported in the table) is 
statistically significant (at 5 percent p level). These results provide support for preferring the FE model. 
However, the FE model was beset by serious problems of multicollinearity, which undermined our ability 
to identify the impacts of variables such as tenure status on land values.
10  
Table 5. Determinants of land purchase prices per hectare, plots purchased since 1998
1. 
Variable 
OLS Model  FE Model
2  IV Model 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient  Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error 
Land tenure status (cf., PF land without HKm) 
-  National  park  0.225 (0.296)  0.537 (0.472)  1.625*** (0.462) 
-  Private  1.238*** (0.307)  0.768 (0.516)  2.016*** (0.218) 
-  HKm  permit  -0.055 (0.248)  -0.374 (0.384)  1.121 (0.715) 
Past  evictions          
- Whether any eviction occurred  -0.264  (0.262)  -0.308 (0.381)  -0.862** (0.374) 
-  Whether  trees  were  uprooted  -0.434 (0.456)  -1.035* (0.607)  0.571 (0.616) 
Plot  characteristics          
ln(area) -0.331**  (0.135)  -0.453*** (0.138)  -0.509*** (0.115) 
ln(year  acquired)  18.456 (96.041)  112.062 (81.360)  -112.526 (82.587) 
ln(mean  altitude)  -0.203 (0.878)  -0.093 (1.337)  0.224 (0.841) 
ln(mean  slope)  0.228** (0.103)  0.081 (0.170) 0.246** (0.111) 
Position  on  slope  (cf.,  top)          
- Middle  -0.142  (0.223)  0.027 (0.226)  -0.112 (0.204) 
-  Bottom  -0.092 (0.283)  -0.007 (0.338)  0.081 (0.251) 
-  Top/middle  0.016 (0.436)  0.087 (0.489)  -1 (0.855) 
-  Middle/bottom  0.327 (0.371)  0.47 (0.492)  0.361 (0.494) 
- Top/middle/bottom  -0.248  (0.583)  0.211 (0.608)  -0.064 (0.304) 
Soil  color  (cf.,  black)          
- Brown  -0.258  (0.238)  -0.207 (0.329)  -0.169 (0.245) 
- Red  -0.431  (0.273)  -0.381 (0.321)  0.144 (0.210) 
- Yellow  -0.667**  (0.328)  -0.802** (0.344)  -0.308 (0.368) 
Soil  texture  (cf.,  clay)          
- Loam  -0.529**  (0.237)  -0.427 (0.260)  -0.775*** (0.186) 
-  Sandy  -0.569 (0.349)  0.103 (0.584)  -0.623 (0.391) 
-  Loamy  clay  0.35 (0.563)  0.596 (0.547)  -0.3 (0.339) 
 
                                                      
10 In the FE regression, the maximum VIF is greater than 90, the VIF is greater than 10 for many variables, including two of 
the land tenure variables (national park and private land), and the VIF for HKm permit status increased to nearly 4 compared with 
a VIF of 1.45 in the regression without fixed effects. The VIF measures the factor by which the variance of a coefficient is 
increased by multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. For example, a VIF of 4 for a coefficient means that the variance 
estimate of the coefficient is four times bigger than it would be without multicollinearity, implying that the standard error is twice 
as big and the t statistic is one-half the size (for the same coefficient estimate), greatly reducing the ability to obtain statistically 
significant results.  23 
 
Table 5. Continued  
Variable 
OLS Model  FE Model
2  IV Model 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error 
- Sandy loam  -0.52  (0.333)  -0.426 (0.441)  -1.109*** (0.371) 
- Sandy, loamy clay  -1.712***  (0.458)  -1.782***  (0.606)     
ln(soil  depth)  0.155 (0.186)  0.126 (0.258)  0.098 (0.169) 
ln(walking time to village leader’s 
office)  -0.152 (0.178)  -0.261 (0.231)  0.384* (0.230) 
ln(walking  time  to  residence)  0.032 (0.068)  -0.025 (0.065)  0.018 (0.055) 
ln(walking time to nearest road)  -0.149  (0.091)  -0.209* (0.124)  -0.11 (0.112) 
ln(walking  time  to  nearest  footpath)  0.123 (0.144)  0.329* (0.189)  0.215 (0.267) 
Trees on the plot at time of purchase 
(cf., mature coffee)          
- Coffee with shade  -0.228  (0.274) -0.475  (0.388) -0.387  (0.336) 
- Mature coffee multistrata 
agroforestry system  -0.754 (0.562)  -0.771* (0.455) -0.43  (0.336) 
- Young coffee (preharvest)  -0.025  (0.394) 0.137  (0.416) 0.026  (0.315) 
- Bush/shrub  -1.434***  (0.269)  -1.100*** (0.316)  -1.600*** (0.297) 
- Coffee with timber trees  -0.441  (0.438)  -0.804* (0.408)  -0.308 (0.375) 
- Defective coffee  -0.945***  (0.316)  -0.579* (0.337)  -1.583*** (0.337) 
- Coffee with fruit trees  0.701  (0.493)  0.631  (0.682)  0.091  (0.550) 
Intercept  -122.992 (730.250)  -834.57 (617.210)  867.359 (628.076) 
          
Number  of  observations  171   171   119  
R
2  0.6947   0.7888   0.8163  
Wald test of village-level fixed 
effects (p value)     0.0491     
Maximum variance inflation factor  6.62    90.46       
Ramsey RESET test of powers of 
fitted values (p  value)  0.2435   0.0559     
Partial R
2 of excluded instruments          0.2210   
Anderson’s canonical correlation LR 
test for weak identification (p  value)        0.0000  
Hansen’s J test of over-identification 
(p  value)        0.1164  
C test of orthogonality of HKm 
permit status (p  value)        0.6471  
1 Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for probability weights and stratification of sample, and standard errors computed 
using White’s robust estimator. 
2 The village-level fixed effects coefficients are not reported to save space. 
FE = village-level fixed effects; IV = instrumental variables; OLS = ordinary least squares. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Tests of the instrumental variables in the IV model revealed that they are relevant (i.e. the 
excluded instrumental variables are strong predictors of the HKm permit status variable, as shown by the 24 
 
partial R
2 of the excluded instruments and Anderson’s canonical correlation LR test). The tests also 
support the assumption that the instrumental variables are exogenous and valid to exclude from the 
regression (i.e., the Hansen’s J test of overidentification restrictions is statistically insignificant (Baum et 
al. 2003; Davidson and MacKinnon 2004). A C test of the exogeneity of the HKm permit status supports 
the assumption of exogeneity (i.e., the test statistic is statistically insignificant). These results support the 
validity of the IV model but indicate that the OLS model is preferred because HKm status is statistically 
exogenous and the OLS model is more efficient.
11  
None of the regression results shows a statistically significant difference in land values between 
PF land with an HKm permit and such land without a permit, controlling for other factors. As expected, 
private land has a much higher value than PF land in all regressions, although this result is not statistically 
significant in the FE model. The lack of significance of this coefficient in the fixed effects regression 
probably results from the high multicollinearity in this model (the VIF of private land is greater than 10 in 
that regression). In all regressions, NP land has a higher value than PF land, although this result is 
statistically significant only in the IV model.  
Past evictions have a negative association with land values in all regressions, as we expected, 
although the association is statistically significant only in the IV model. Whether trees were uprooted in a 
past eviction has a weakly statistically significant (significant at the 10 percent but not the 5 percent level) 
negative impact only in the FE model. It appears that whatever impact a past eviction may have had on 
tenure security when it occurred, the effect of the eviction on the value of the land was attenuated by the 
Reformasi.  
Of course, uprooting of trees can also influence the value of land by affecting the stock of trees 
on the plots. In all the regressions, we found that plots covered with bush or shrubs are worth 
substantially less than plots having mature coffee stands. For example, the coefficient of –1.434 for bush 
and shrub land in the OLS regression implies that bush and shrub land is worth only about 24 percent (e
-
1.434 = 0.238) of the value of similar plots having mature coffee. Thus, uprooting of trees had a major 
negative impact on the wealth of some users of PF land, even if the tenure insecurity of the land was 
mitigated by the Reformasi. As we expected, plots with defective stands of coffee are worth less than 
those with mature healthy coffee (in all models). We also found some evidence that farmers value plots 
with multistrata coffee-agroforestry systems less than they do those with coffee monoculture, with a 
negative coefficient of this variable in all regressions, although it is (weakly) statistically significant only 
in the fixed effects regression. This suggests that farmers may perceive that multistrata coffee-
agroforestry systems result in economic trade-offs. We discuss this issue further later in the report when 
assessing the determinants of plot-level profitability. 
Other factors with statistically significant impacts (at the 5 percent level) on land values in at least 
one of the models include plot size (negative impact in all models), slope (positive impact in the OLS and 
IV models), soil color (lower value of yellow soils than black soils in the OLS and FE models), and soil 
texture (lower value of loamy soil, sandy loam, or mixed sandy-loamy-clay soils relative to clay soils in 
some models).  
These results do not support the hypothesis that the HKm program has increased land tenure 
security and thus land values, although they do demonstrate the greater tenure security and value of 
private tenure. Part of the reason for the limited estimated impacts of HKm permits on observed land 
values is likely that it takes substantial time for people to become aware of the program and develop 
confidence in its impact on tenure security. Most of the purchases of HKm permit plots analyzed in 
Tables 4 and 5 occurred by 2002, before the HKm program was long established. It may be that later 
purchases of HKm permit plots, after the program had been operating a few years, would have yielded 
higher values relative to non-HKm plots. Unfortunately, we did not have sufficient observations of more-
recent purchases of HKm plots to estimate such effects.  
                                                      
11 OLS is generally more efficient than IV estimation, but that is particularly true in this case because many observations 
were lost in the IV model as a result of the lack of availability of the instrumental variables for plot owners who lived outside the 
watershed. 25 
 
The finding of a higher value for NP land than for PF land (though significant only in the IV 
regression) was unexpected and suggests that use restrictions are not well enforced on NP land, resulting 
in tenure being at least as secure on that land as on PF land. Although HKm has not clearly improved land 
tenure security and land values, to the extent that it prevents future efforts to uproot trees, it will help to 
prevent losses in wealth of HKm permit holders. Further, HKm still may have impacts on tree planting 
and SWC investments as a result of enforcement of the requirements of HKm permits. We discuss this in 
the following sections. 
Impacts on Tree Planting 
Recall information collected in the household survey on tree planting, survival, and cutting since 2000 
were combined with measured stocks of trees on the sample plots to estimate changes in tree stocks since 
1999.
12 The estimated mean stocks per hectare of coffee, timber trees, multipurpose trees, and shade trees 
for each stratum in the survey are shown in Figures 6 through 9. According to these estimates, stocks of 
all kinds of trees have increased throughout the various strata of the Sumberjaya watershed since 1999.  
Coffee trees are more common than all other types of trees in all strata. Coffee stocks have 
increased in all strata but most rapidly on plots with HKm permits or HKm applications in process where 
evictions occurred in the past, and least rapidly on plots with HKm permits where no past evictions 
occurred (Figure 6). Apparently, farmers are planting coffee in response to past evictions (which involved 
uprooting coffee trees in some cases), and the HKm process may be facilitating their efforts. 
                                                      
12 The following equation was used to estimate the stocks of trees by year: Ending stocks in year t = Ending stocks in year t 
– 1 + (Number of trees planted in year t) × (Proportion of trees planted in year t surviving) – Number of trees cut in t. Because 
ending stocks in 2005 were measured and the number of trees planted, the proportion surviving, and the number cut were 
estimated for each year between 2000 and 2005, the ending stocks could be estimated for each prior year back to 1999. 26 
 




































Stock of coffee trees
National Park Private land
HKM permit eviction HKMpermit no eviction
HKM in process eviction HKM in process no eviction
Source: Estimated from household survey. 
Timber trees are the least common type of trees in all strata. Timber stocks are the largest and 
have increased the most on plots with HKm permits where evictions took place in the past, followed by 
other plots with HKm permits where no evictions occurred or plots with permit applications in process 
(with or without past evictions; Figure 7). The lowest stocks of timber trees and least amount of planting 
of timber trees occurred on NP land, private land, and PF land without an HKm permit or application 
pending but with a past eviction. It thus appears that the HKm process is promoting timber tree planting. 
However, most of the increase in timber stocks has occurred since 2003, when the Gerakan Nasional 
Rehabilitasi Hutan dan Lahan (GNRHL) reforestation program was initiated. This program provides 
farmers with seedlings of timber and other noncoffee forest trees, along with incentives for planting. 
Given the timing of tree planting activities, it appears that the GNRHL program has had a larger effect 
than the HKm program in promoting planting of timber trees, because all the HKm permits received in 
the Sumberjaya watershed were issued by 2002 (unless the tree-planting response to HKm permits was 
delayed). 27 
 






























Stock of timber trees
National Park Private land HKM permit eviction
HKMpermit no eviction HKM in process eviction HKM in process no eviction
no HKM eviction no hkm no eviction
 
Source: Estimated from household survey. 
The situation is similar for multipurpose trees (Figure 8). Planting of these trees has been greatest 
and 2005 stocks were largest on plots with HKm permits or HKm applications in process, with or without 
past evictions. The least planting of such trees has occurred on NP land, private land, and PF land without 
an HKm permit or an application in process. As with timber trees, most planting of multipurpose trees has 
occurred since 2003, coinciding with the GNRHL program.  28 
 


























Stock of multipurpose trees
National Park Private land
HKM permit eviction HKMpermit no eviction
HKM in process eviction HKM in process no eviction
 
Source: Estimated from household survey. 
The stock of shade trees is largest and has increased the most on plots with HKm permits or HKm 
applications in process, with past evictions. Planting of shade trees is least on plots with HKm permits or 
application in process and no past evictions, NP plots, and private plots (Figure 9). The pattern of shade 
tree planting is more even over time than is the pattern for timber or multipurpose trees, probably because 
shade trees are associated with coffee planting where shade coffee is grown and because the GNRHL 
program does not promote shade tree planting. 29 
 



























Stock of shade trees
National Park Private land HKM permit eviction
HKMpermit no eviction HKM in process eviction HKM in process no eviction
no HKM eviction no hkm no eviction
 
Source: Estimated from household survey. 
Evidently, differences in tree planting may result from differences in past evictions, the stock of 
trees already on the plot, and other programs such as GNRHL, as well as from differences in land tenure 
and HKm status. It is thus important to try to control for differences in such factors to be able to assess 
the impacts of HKm on tree planting. We did this using econometric analysis of the tree planting data. 
Econometric Model for Tree Planting 
The model for tree planting is of the following form: 
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 (2) 
where TPpt05 is a vector representing the number of trees planted per hectare of different tree types 
(coffee, timber, multipurpose, and shade trees) between 2000 and 2005; TP*pt05 is an incompletely 30 
 
observed index function indicating the demand for tree planting (which equals TPpt05 when the demand is 
positive but results in zero tree planting otherwise); Tpt05 represents the tenure and HKm status of the plot 
during the 2000–2005 period; Xpt0 represents the quality characteristics of and stocks of trees on the plot 
in 2000; GNRHLpt05 is a dummy variable representing whether assistance was available under the 
GNRHL reforestation program for the plot during 2000–2005; Zht0 represents household-level factors (as 
of the year 2000) affecting the household’s incentive and ability to invest in tree planting; δ0, δT, δX, δG, 
and δZ are vectors of parameters to be estimated; and u
TP
pt05 is an error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean.  
The vector of tenure and HKm variables (Tpt05) is similar to that used in equation (1), except that 
here it reflects whether an HKm permit had been obtained or had been applied for by 2005 rather than 
HKm permit status at the time of purchase. It also includes dummy variables representing how the plot 
was acquired (i.e., by inheritance, purchase, sharecropping or exchange; encroached plots were the 
omitted category) because we considered more than just purchased plots, as we did in the analysis of land 
values.  
We expected having an HKm permit or permit application to increase investment in tree planting 
in general if the permit or application had increased land tenure security. HKm status might also increase 
tree planting because of the requirement to plant a minimum number of noncoffee trees (mainly timber 
and multipurpose trees) per hectare. If these requirements, rather than increased tenure security, are the 
main cause of increased tree planting, we would not expect as much impact of HKm status on planting of 
coffee or shade trees as on timber and multipurpose trees. Past evictions might have mixed impacts on 
tree planting; they might reduce the incentive to plant trees if they increase perceived tenure insecurity on 
the plot. On the other hand, on plots where trees were uprooted in past evictions, farmers might need to 
plant more trees. The means of acquiring the plot can also affect tree-planting investment by affecting 
tenure security. We expected farmers to plant more trees on plots acquired by inheritance or purchase 
than on plots acquired through encroachment or through temporary arrangements such as sharecropping 
or leasing. 
The plot quality characteristics (Xpt0) are also similar to those in equation (1), except that the land 
use (if not planted to trees), whether the plot had been cleared, and the estimated stocks of the various 
types of trees in 2000 were used as indicators of the initial state of the plot rather than the dummy 
variables used in equation (1) for the tree types on the plot at the time of purchase. The household-level 
factors influencing the household’s incentive and ability to invest in trees include its endowments of 
physical, human, natural, financial, and social capital in 2000 and access to technical assistance during 
2000–2005. The indicators of these endowments include the value of land of various types owned by the 
household (paddy land, coffee land, other land); the value of livestock, transportation equipment, other 
equipment, and buildings owned by the household; the age, gender, occupation (whether agriculture is the 
primary occupation), and ethnicity of the household head; the household size and dependency ratio; the 
mean number of years of education of males and females; the number of years the household had been 
settled in the area by 2000; whether any household members participated in a coffee producers’ group or 
labor-sharing group; the distance from the household residence to the nearest output market; whether the 
household had access to formal sector credit; and access of the household to technical assistance from the 
Forest Department, the Agriculture Department, or ICRAF.  
The econometric model used to estimate equation (2) is a maximum likelihood Tobit censored 
regression model.
13 As in estimation of equation (1), we tested the model with and without village-level 
fixed effects. In all cases (except for timber tree planting, for which the fixed effects model did not 
converge because of inadequate variation of the dependent variable within villages), we found that the 
village-level fixed effects coefficients are highly statistically significant, indicating that the fixed effects 
                                                      
13 We also attempted to estimate equation (2) using censored quantile regressions, which are robust to violations of 
distributional assumptions (Koenker and Hallock 2001). However, we were unable to obtain convergence of these regressions at 
quantile levels below 95 percent, and thus could not gauge the robustness of this approach. We therefore report only the Tobit 
results. 31 
 
model was the better model. Thus, we report only the results of the fixed effects models (except for 
timber tree planting). The test for multicollinearity revealed that the maximum VIF in the regressions with 
fixed effects is 8.6, considered in econometrics textbooks to be within the acceptable range (e.g., 
Mukherjee et al. 1998), although higher than for the model without fixed effects (maximum VIF is 4.4 in 
that model). Except for the village intercept coefficients in the fixed effects model, few variables have 
VIF greater than 5 (only the tenure variables for private plots and plots with HKm applications in process 
and the altitude of the plot). Thus, for most variables, the level of multicollinearity appears to be 
acceptable even with fixed effects included, although the ability to identify the impacts of some variables 
with statistical confidence is impaired in this model.  
We also tested for exogeneity of the HKm permit status (whether received or applied for) using 
the exogeneity test of Smith and Blundell (1986) for censored regression models. The same instrumental 
variables used to predict HKm status in estimating the IV model for equation (1)—that is, the bridging 
social capital indicators—were used as instrumental variables for the HKm status variables in the 
exogeneity tests for equation (2). In all cases, the test supports exogeneity of these variables. 
Econometric Results 
The econometric results are reported in Table 6. We found that timber tree planting between 2000 and 
2005 was greatest on plots with HKm permits or HKm applications pending, controlling for other factors. 
Planting of multipurpose trees was greater on all kinds of tenure compared with NP land but largest on 
plots with pending applications for HKm permits. Planting of shade trees was also greater on plots with 
HKm permit applications pending than on NP land, although this difference is only significant at the 10 
percent level. We found no statistically significant differences in coffee planting on plots of different 
tenure and HKm status.  
These results, combined with the results of the land value regressions, suggest that the impacts of 
the HKm program on tree planting may result from the program’s tree-planting requirements rather than 
its impact on tenure security. If the program’s impacts were primarily caused by increased tenure security, 
we would have expected to also find a significant impact from the program on planting of trees not 
specifically required by the program, such as coffee.  
Consistent with this explanation, we found that past evictions have insignificant impacts on tree 
planting, suggesting that tenure insecurity associated with past evictions is not having a large 
differentiated impact on HKm plots compared with other plots. However, we found that planting of 
timber, multipurpose, and shade trees is significantly greater on plots where trees were uprooted. This 
may reflect farmers’ belief that planting such trees will help to increase their tenure security, as argued by 
Otsuka and Place (2001). 
As expected, the GNRHL program has had a positive impact on planting of multipurpose trees. 
We did not find that GNRHL has had a statistically significant impact on planting of other types of trees, 
however. 32 
Table 6. Determinants of tree planting, 2000–2005 (number of trees per ha)
1 
Explanatory Variables 
Timber Multipurpose  Shade Coffee 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Land tenure variables (Tpt05)              
Land tenure and HKm status (cf., national park land) 
-  Private  736.83 (743.65)  1128.97* (602.13)  389.35 (992.05)  1437.84 (2489.27) 
- HKm permit  2239.47***  (816.54)  1510.03*  (886.48)  1626.67  (1322.80)  -2449.67  (3603.08) 
-  HKm  application  pending  1311.36** (641.02) 1688.26*** (590.73)  1607.63* (975.35)  2625.93 (2474.68) 
- PF land without HKm   -424.71  (709.53)  1469.41**  (665.04)  1798.2  (1102.85)  -43.69  (3271.03) 
Past  evictions              
- Whether an eviction occurred  -447.7  (662.53)  -35.31  (432.07)  -611.94  (697.57)  3124.71  (2540.34) 
-  Whether  trees  were  uprooted  1706.54** (833.53)  1581.17** (625.15) 1956.85** (990.28)  6281.86 (4078.56) 
How plot acquired (cf., encroached)              
-  Inherited  68.13 (516.67)  -28.26 (417.99)  -617.81 (551.18)  24.05 (1918.15) 
-  Purchased  713.61* (409.89)  399.84* (231.30)  510.17 (415.79) 3742.83** (1571.50) 
-  Sharecropped  776.69 (982.54)  -487.4 (741.58)  -2411.24*** (836.63)  1560.22 (2558.56) 
- Exchanged  381.24  (1310.85)  -1597.66**  (747.98) -2836.36*  (1616.87)  12961.07***  (4693.43) 
Plot characteristics (Xpt0)              
Area  (ha)  455.68 (361.92)  442.61* (266.34)  -371.94 (303.22)  -3306.72*** (1022.77) 
Soil  color  (cf.,  black)              
-  Yellow  1281.02** (546.02)  -353.28 (341.92)  -1829.77*** (624.81)  -1910.02 (2026.79) 
-  Red  850.05* (470.47)  402.71 (304.25) -1121.32** (492.18)  458.55 (1601.30) 
-  Brown  570.12 (519.84)  -385.92 (336.07)  -1991.22*** (646.93) -3935.96** (1876.11) 
Soil  texture  (cf.,  loamy)              
-  Clay  -132.74 (501.09)  224.21 (320.03)  233.41 (447.76)  -664.99 (1501.60) 
-  Sandy  -369.74 (536.33)  562.54 (391.99) -1159.48** (518.69)  -1110.59 (1793.37) 
Altitude  (m)  6.53*** (2.36)  4.23** (1.78)  -1.11 (2.90)  -3.47  (7.46) 
Average  slope  (%)  3.01 (7.81)  -0.06 (6.04) 17.44** (8.78)  -2.29 (29.03) 
Topsoil  depth  (cm)    43.61 (29.50)  16.02 (17.54)  -14.77 (28.94)  13.05  (95.06) 33 
 
Table 6. Continued. 
Explanatory Variables 
Timber Multipurpose  Shade Coffee 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Position of plot on slope (cf., bottom)                 
-  Top  -673.82 (549.03)  24.7 (343.33)  -268.5 (467.95)  -1648.55 (1589.78) 
-  Middle  711.04 (471.69)  -402.57 (292.51)  -618.45 (418.07)  209.44 (1589.27) 
-  Top/middle/bottom  -1610.78* (841.85)  94.82 (593.28) -2393.16** (997.27)  -980.91 (3132.11) 
Fallow/shrub  land  in  2000  -2444.32*** (836.36)  -348.73 (380.38)  259 (451.16)  3515.43* (2072.03) 
Trees on plot in 2000 (number/ha)                 
-  Timber  trees  8.46*** (3.17)  2.72 (1.90)  1.45 (1.50)  -9.2  (8.44) 
- Multipurpose trees  6.50***  (2.07)  8.00*** (1.63)  1.58 (1.28)  21.66***  (6.94) 
-  Shade  trees  -0.79 (0.50)  -0.22 (0.23)  0.99* (0.57)  -0.34  (1.46) 
-  Coffee  0.26* (0.15)  0.28* (0.15)  -0.04 (0.10)  -0.87*  (0.45) 
Land  cleared  by  2000  -294.74 (858.86)  280 (460.07)  2288.57*** (769.56)  3909.02 (2856.95) 
Walking time from residence (min)  -0.77  (3.39)  1.3  (2.50)  1.05  (3.68)  -7.08  (15.39) 
Walking time from road (min)  2.64  (4.55)  -2.36  (2.65)  5.37  (4.25)  38.57***  (13.92) 
GNRHL approved (GNRHLpt05)  651.57 (483.75)  747.48** (350.04)  569.45 (417.25)  1564.91 (1657.75) 
Household characteristics in 2000 (Zht0)             
Value of assets (millions of Rupiah)                 
- Rice land  -14.53  (10.62)  -15.44*  (8.25)  -21.84**  (10.75)  10.8  (29.19) 
- Coffee land  -24.32**  (12.16)  -4.24  (5.09)  5.17  (11.22)  2.51  (33.84) 
-  Other  land  0.07 (33.16)  16.56 (15.17)  -18.96 (48.47)  -92.72 (113.02) 
-  Livestock  -82.33 (112.33)  -59.36  (83.45) 414.70*** (157.33)  724.40**  (361.90) 
-  Farm  equipment  91.9 (296.70)  -300.82 (187.19)  -459.28* (263.85)  -699.5  (713.71) 
-  Transportation  equipment  37.7 (34.09)  31.92 (20.26) -156.58** (62.85)  -47.86 (131.48) 
-  Buildings  -19.67*  (10.39)  -0.23 (4.35)  21.58*** (7.78)  37.08 (27.11) 
Ethnicity  (cf.,  Sumendo)              
-  Javanese  -1437.69** (624.13)  92.89 (347.25) -1700.67***  (567.53) -7810.27***  (2926.38) 
-  Sundanese  -1146.79** (499.83)  794.82** (327.14)  -566.6 (536.02)  -1208.69 (2996.08) 34 
 
Table 6. Continued 
Explanatory Variables 
Timber Multipurpose  Shade Coffee 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Age  of  the  household  head  19.54 (22.68)  -25.01* (13.99)  1.03 (20.21)  -102.53  (78.95) 
Dependency  ratio  810.53 (1170.40)  1034.23  (859.48) 3532.40*** (1213.32)  6768.37*  (3548.84) 
Years of education of males  22.36  (72.39)  -7.43  (38.76)  -105.41  (66.17)  -123.42  (209.62) 
Years of education of females  41.64  (74.12)  103.20**  (45.57)  -175.26***  (66.73)  -464.51**  (234.33) 
Occupation  nonagricultural  522.33 (1109.21)  1005.71  (811.35)  2835.93** (1172.99) 19164.40**  (8090.00) 
Male  household  head  1300.53 (954.51)  -104.82 (685.05)  3816.87***  (1138.02)  10503.39** (4969.12) 
Female share of family labor supply  30.88**  (13.08)  -0.97  (7.57)  15.4  (10.65)  59.23  (36.86) 
Family  size  -47.58 (179.47)  26.82 (117.13)  -457.38** (207.80) -1434.82**  (599.81) 
Years household settled in village  -11.35  (15.74)  12.09  (10.10)  -43.20**  (18.58)  65.78  (74.58) 
Household members’ participation in groups 
- Coffee producers’ group  -3321.16***  (1122.59)  -1241.38 (758.89)  718.34 (895.43)  -2010.23 (3596.49) 
-  Labor-sharing  group  1617.08*** (575.47)  221.45 (450.18)  -658.94 (722.23)  -2679.77 (1955.88) 
Distance to output market (km)  -178.03***  (59.82)  25.89  (33.46)  132.20**  (54.43)  248.97  (168.28) 
Access  to  formal  credit  332.38 (434.51)  -173.93 (255.23)  -38.98 (421.69)  2240.61* (1230.68) 
Access to technical assistance                 
-  ICRAF  1744.11 (1095.70)  488.15  (818.33) -3363.34*** (1224.57) -11065.80**  (4594.97) 
-  Forest  Department  690.66 (446.41)  97.97 (251.99)  699.73 (611.86)  6946.44*** (2136.70) 
-  Agriculture  Department  206.05 (783.10)  -252.97 (477.54) 1903.41** (745.44)  4100.39 (3659.50) 
Number  of  observations  607  607   607   607   
Left  censored  observations  390  307   428   357   
Uncensored  observations  217  300   179   250   
Joint significance of village-level 
fixed effects  NA   0.000***   0.000***   0.003***   
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of 
HKm permit and applied for HKm 
variables (p  value)  0.2500   0.3472   0.4909   0.5118   
1 Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for probability weights and stratification of sample, and standard errors computed using White’s robust estimator. Village-level fixed 
effects not estimated in timber trees regression because of lack of convergence. Intercepts (fixed effects) not reported to save space. Tobit regressions with village-level fixed 
effects. 
ICRAF = World Agroforestry Centre. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 35 
Other factors we found to have significant impacts on planting of some types of trees include the 
means of plot acquisition; the initial stock of trees on the plot; household endowments of physical assets, 
human capital, and social capital; access to technical assistance, markets, and roads; and plot quality 
characteristics. We do not discuss the impacts of these other factors in detail here or in subsequent 
discussions of econometric results, because this study focused on the impacts of the HKm program.  
The econometric results demonstrate that many factors beside land tenure security and access to 
the HKm program influenced tree planting decisions. Although we controlled for the influences of such 
factors using econometric methods, the validity of those methods are dependent on the parametric 
assumptions that underlie them, particularly the assumed linear relationship and the assumed normality of 
the error term in equation (2). One method of addressing the weaknesses of econometric regression 
analysis is to use propensity score matching (PSM). The next subsection describes how we used PSM to 
investigate differences in tree planting on plots of various tenure and HKm statuses. 
Assessment of Tree-Planting Impacts Using Propensity Score Matching
14 
As a method of impact assessment, PSM involves selecting “treatment” and “control” observations that 
are as similar as possible in their observable characteristics, so that estimated differences in outcomes of 
interest between the two groups can be attributed as much as possible to differences in the treatment of 
interest. The intent of PSM is to mimic an experimental approach by selecting observations having 
similar observable characteristics. This is not equivalent to experimental random assignment, which 
ensures that the groups are similar in terms of unobservable as well as observable characteristics, but is 
similar to standard regression analysis in assuming that the unobservable differences in outcomes are 
conditionally independent (conditional on the observable characteristics) of the selection of the 
observations into treatment and control groups. As in an OLS model (but unlike in an IV model, which 
can control for biases resulting from selection on unobservables if valid and relevant instrumental 
variables are available), failure of this conditional independence assumption can cause the results of PSM 
to be biased. Unfortunately, this assumption is not directly testable (Heckman et al. 1998). However, 
because our test of exogeneity of the HKm status variables in the econometric analysis described in the 
previous subsection supports the assumption of exogeneity, this strengthens our confidence in using PSM 
to compare across various HKm and land tenure groups. 
The advantage of PSM over econometric regression analysis is that it seeks to compare only 
comparable observations and does not rely on parametric assumptions to identify the impacts of a 
treatment. According to the work of Heckman et al. (1998), the bias resulting from comparing 
incomparable observations can be much larger than the bias resulting from selection on unobservables, 
which is the more usual concern.  
For comparing binary “treatment versus control” outcomes, PSM is implemented by first running 
a binary response model (usually a probit or logit model) to predict whether observations are in the 
treatment or control samples (the probabilities predicted by this model are referred to as propensity 
scores). Then matching control observations are selected for comparison to the treatment observations, 
based on being similar to the treatment observations in terms of their propensity scores. The rationale for 
doing this is that matching on propensity scores removes bias associated with pretreatment differences in 
observable variables, and it is much easier to match observations on scalar propensity scores than on a 
multidimensional set of variables, as required by approaches involving matching on the covariates 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The matching sets of observations are selected to have “common support,” 
meaning that both treatment and control observations are taken from ranges of the values of the 
propensity scores for which both types of observations are observed.  
Various methods may be used to select the matching observations, including one-to-one matching 
(e.g., selecting the nearest neighbor, or nearest neighbor within some tolerance [called caliper matching in 
the literature]), selecting a set of nearest neighbors among the control observations (e.g., all neighbors 
                                                      
14 Some useful references on propensity score matching include Heckman et al. (1998), Smith and Todd (2001), and Imbens 
(2004). The seminal paper on the method is Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 36 
 
within a given radius of the treatment propensity score are selected with radius matching), comparing the 
treatment to the average of the nearest neighbors, or more generally using a weighted average of the 
control observations for comparison. The main advantage of using multiple control observations to 
compute the comparison mean is that it reduces the variance of the estimator (Smith and Todd 2001). 
Methods used to select the weights of control observations in the comparison group include kernel 
functions (such as the normal density function), which are unimodal symmetric functions that generate 
declining weights for observations with propensity scores further in absolute value from the treatment 
observation, local linear matching (which is a generalization of kernel matching), and other approaches 
(Smith and Todd 2001).  
In our application, we used kernel matching with the normal kernel function for weighting the 
control observations. We used PSM to make binary comparisons between tree planting for three pairs of 
comparisons on PF land with various HKm statuses: (1) plots with HKm permits versus plots with HKm 
applications pending, (2) plots with HKm permits versus plots without HKm permits or applications, and 
(3) plots with HKm applications versus plots without HKm applications. PSM was not feasible for other 
possible comparisons involving non-PF land (e.g., plots with HKm permits or applications versus NP land 
or private land) because of a lack of sufficient numbers of observations with common support for those 
comparisons. The first stage of each analysis involved a probit regression for the plots included in the 
binary comparison (e.g., plots with HKm permits versus those with applications pending). We used the 
full set of explanatory variables in equation (2) to predict whether plots were in one or the other state of 
the binary comparison, except for the GNRHL variable, because HKm status was determined in all cases 
in the Sumberjaya watershed before initiation of the GNRHL program in 2003 (so access to GNRHL 
could not be considered a determinant of HKm status). We also excluded the village-level fixed effects in 
this model, because the model was not estimable with them included. The rationale for including all other 
variables is that any variable that affects farmers’ incentive or ability to plant trees would be expected to 
affect their incentive to participate in the HKm program.  
The results of these probit models are presented in Table 7. We found that plots where past 
evictions occurred are more likely to have obtained HKm permits than those having either HKm 
applications pending or no applications by the time of our survey. However, plots where trees were 
uprooted are less likely to have HKm permits than either of those alternatives. It is not surprising that a 
past eviction increases the likelihood of a group pursuing an HKm permit but surprising that uprooting 
trees in an eviction reduces the likelihood. Perhaps people have become more distrustful of the 
government in areas where trees were uprooted and less likely to apply for HKm permits as a result. 
Several household characteristics are associated with differences in access to the HKm program. 
Households with more coffee land are, not surprisingly, more likely to be part of a group that applied for 
an HKm permit, whereas those with more paddy land are less likely to have applied, probably because 
they are less concerned about coffee production on PF land. Javanese households are more likely to be 
part of a group that applied or obtained an HKm permit than Sumendo households, whereas Sundanese 
households are more likely to have already obtained a permit than to have an application pending. Older 
household heads, households with a higher dependency ratio, and households with more-educated males 
are also more likely to have already obtained a permit. Larger households are less likely to have either 
applied for or obtained a permit. Households closer to an output market are more likely to have obtained a 
permit. Households with access to technical assistance from the Forest Department are more likely to 
have obtained a permit. This finding is consistent with the results of our community survey showing that 
a group with an HKm permit is more likely to have staff of the Forest Department or friends of Forest 
Department staff living in the village (Kerr et al. 2006). These findings are generally consistent with the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 and suggest that social and human capital and access to markets 
and technical assistance are important determinants of participation in the HKm program.  37 
 
Table 7. Estimation of propensity scores for binary comparisons of HKm status (probit regression 
results) 
Explanatory Variables 
HKm Permit – HKm 
Application Pending 
HKm Permit – PF 
Land without HKm 
HKm Application – PF 
Land without HKm 
Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient Std. error Coefficient  Std. error 
Tenure status in 2000            
Past evictions             
- Whether an eviction occurred  0.762** -0.359 1.298** -0.564 0.048  -0.447
- Whether trees were uprooted  -0.933** -0.429 -1.814*** -0.65 0.249  -0.504
How plot acquired (cf., encroached)   
- Inherited  0.299 -0.361 -0.226 -0.407 -0.311  -0.297
- Purchased  -0.009 -0.229 0.096 -0.267 -0.068  -0.207
- Sharecropped  1.390** -0.636 0.942* -0.562 0.297  -0.674
- Exchanged  NE -1.034 -0.832 NE 
Plot characteristics   
Area (ha)  0.109 -0.194 0.029 -0.179 -0.033  -0.16
Soil color (cf., black)   
- Yellow  0.523 -0.351 0.486 -0.387 -0.223  -0.328
- Red  0.526* -0.275 0.667* -0.347 -0.546*  -0.28
- Brown  -0.604** -0.281 -0.248 -0.306 -0.214  -0.25
Soil texture (cf., loam)   
- Clay  0.421* -0.237 -0.107 -0.275 -0.343  -0.218
- Sandy  -0.054 -0.375 -0.462 -0.366 -0.494* -0.287
Altitude (m)  0.007*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.001 -0.004***  -0.001
Slope (%)  -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 0.005  -0.005
Soil depth (cm)  0.002 -0.017 0.013 -0.02 -0.019  -0.015
Position on slope (cf., bottom)   
- Top  0.579* -0.336 0.164 -0.382 -0.513  -0.324
- Middle  -0.099 -0.245 -0.253 -0.311 -0.139 -0.257
- Top/middle/bottom  -0.499 -0.725 1.957* -1.182 1.889*  -1.113
Fallow/shrub plot in 2000  0.212 -0.328 0.509 -0.355 -0.223  -0.279
Stock of trees in 2000 (no./ha)   
- Timber  0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001  -0.001
- Multipurpose  0.001 -0.001 0.003** -0.001 0.000  -0.001
- Shade  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
- Coffee  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Plot cleared by 2000  -0.167 -0.513 1.829** -0.793 1.218**  -0.55
Walking time from residence (min)  -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.001  -0.002
Walking time from road (min)  -0.013*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
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Table 7. Continued 
Explanatory Variables 
HKm Permit – HKm 
Application Pending 
HKm Permit – PF 
Land without HKm 
HKm Application – PF 
Land without HKm 
Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient Std. error Coefficient  Std. error 
Household characteristics in 2000            
Value of assets (millions of Rupiah)             
- Rice land  0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.020**  -0.009
- Coffee land  0 -0.006 0.013* -0.007 0.018**  -0.007
- Other land  0.087 -0.062 -0.016 -0.022 -0.067  -0.05
- Livestock  -0.31 -0.356 0.287 -0.537 0.217  -0.329
- Farm equipment   0.043 -0.148 0.212 -0.202 -0.047  -0.211
- Transport equipment  0.006 -0.036 -0.053* -0.031 -0.054  -0.034
- Buildings  -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.007 0.004  -0.003
Ethnicity (cf., Sumendo)   
- Javanese  0.318 -0.314 0.977*** -0.345 0.584**  -0.262
- Sundanese  0.687** -0.32 0.494 -0.351 -0.029 -0.251
Age of the household head  0.030** -0.012 0.011 -0.011 -0.005  -0.01
Dependency ratio  2.167*** -0.76 1.248* -0.752 -1.049  -0.68
Years of education of males  0.137*** -0.044 0.086* -0.047 -0.054  -0.038
Years of education of females  0.035 -0.04 0.025 -0.046 0.054  -0.037
Occupation nonagricultural  -0.159 -0.999 1.085 -0.876 -0.256  -0.558
Male household head  -0.093 -0.721 -1.356 -1.035 -1.799* -0.959
Female share of labor supply  0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.009  -0.006
Family size  -0.511*** -0.136 -0.440*** -0.143 0.149  -0.105
Years household settled in village  -0.005 -0.009 0.015 -0.01 0.002 -0.009
Participation in groups   
- Coffee producers’ group  0.318 -0.586 NE NE 
- Labor-sharing group  0.000 -0.388 1.002* -0.559 0.940*  -0.56
Distance to output market (km)  -0.154*** -0.044 -0.061 -0.05 0.052  -0.034
Access to formal credit  -0.03 -0.245 -0.113 -0.267 0.045  -0.227
Access to technical assistance   
- ICRAF  0.038 -0.484 NE NE 
- Forest Department  0.112 -0.221 0.926*** -0.287 0.408*  -0.238
- Agriculture Department  -0.189 -0.421 -0.119 -0.456 -0.511 -0.434
Intercept -7.854*** -1.674 -3.692* -2.03 6.054***  -1.6
   
Number of observations  300 281 290 
ICRAF = World Agroforestry Centre; PF = Protection Forest. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively 39 
 
We also found some differences in plot quality characteristics between PF plots of different HKm 
status. Plots with HKm permits are at higher altitudes than either plots with HKm applications pending or 
plots without HKm applications, while plots with applications pending tend to be at lower altitudes than 
PF plots without HKm applications. HKm permit plots are less likely to have brown soil than HKm 
application plots. HKm plots had greater stocks of multipurpose trees in 2000 than did non-HKm plots, 
and both plots with HKm permits and those with HKm applications were more likely to have been cleared 
than were plots without HKm applications by 2000. HKm permit plots are closer to the nearest road than 
are PF plots with or without HKm applications. These results suggest that farmers are more apt to pursue 
HKm permits for plots with prior investments and good road access.  
In Table 8, we present the mean pairwise differences among PF plots having different HKm 
statuses, using PSM to match plots that have similar propensity scores using the results of the probit 
regressions presented in Table 7. We found statistically insignificant differences in tree planting between 
plots with HKm permits and those with applications pending, that planting of both timber and 
multipurpose trees is greater on HKm permit plots than on plots without an HKm application, and that 
multipurpose tree planting is (weakly significantly) greater on plots with HKm applications in process 
than on plots without an HKm application. These results are qualitatively similar to the econometric 
regression results presented in Table 6, which show that planting of both timber and multipurpose trees is 
greatest on plots with HKm permits or with HKm applications pending. Unlike in the regression results, 
we were unable to compare tree planting on HKm plots to planting on NP or private land using PSM, 
because there was an insufficient number of comparable observations of HKm plots and NP or private 
plots. This finding indicates that the regression results in Table 6 comparing HKm plots to the other types 
of tenure are based on comparing noncomparable observations and thus may be subject to biases.  
Combining the regression and PSM results, we have robust evidence that the HKm program 
contributes to increased planting of timber and multipurpose trees. Because we did not find comparable 
evidence that the program contributed to increased planting of nonprescribed types of trees, it appears that 
these impacts are more likely the result of the tree planting requirements of the program than of increased 
tenure security. 
Next we report on the impacts the HKm program has had on farmers’ investments in land 
improvements and use of land management practices. 40 
Table 8. Comparison of tree planting between PF plots of varying HKm status using PSM
1 
Comparison 
Timber Multipurpose Shade  Coffee 
Mean Std.  error
2  N
3  Mean Std.  error
2  N
3  Mean Std.  error
2  N
3  Mean Std.  error
2  N
3 
HKm permit –  
HKm application in process 
201.1  556.0 300  431.6  521.2 300 -773.4  535.4 300 634.3  1250.8 300 
HKm permit –  
PF land without HKm 
326.5**  166.7 281 472.8**  234.6 281  -41.3  261.1 281 178.8  1924.0 281 
HKm application in process – 
PF land without HKm 
151.5  237.2 290  204.4*  109.4 290  37.0  904.0 290  -79.2  2093.1 290 
1 Matching procedure: kernel matching with replacement, using the normal kernel.  
2 Standard errors computed using bootstrapping. 
3 Number of matched observations based on a requirement of common support of the treatment and control observation by dropping any treatment observation with a propensity 
score higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Impacts on Land Investments and Land Management Practices 
The most common land investments applied to hillside plots in the Sumberjaya watershed are sediment 
pits (found on about 15 percent of plots between 2000 and 2005), followed by land clearing and terraces 
(each about 6 percent of plots; Table 9). Soil fertility management practices include application of 
inorganic fertilizer (47 percent of plots) and compost (14 percent of plots). Investment in sediment pits is 
most common on private plots, followed by plots where evictions occurred in the past with HKm permits 
or pending HKm applications. Investment in land clearing is most common on plots with HKm 
applications pending, with or without past evictions, and on plots with HKm permits but no past 
evictions. Terrace investment is most common on HKm permit plots with past evictions. Use of fertilizer 
is also most common on HKm permit plots with past evictions, followed by private plots. Use of compost 
is most common on private and NP plots. 
Econometric Model for Land Investments and Land Management Practices 
The econometric model for land investments or use of land management practices between 2000 and 
2005 is given by the following equation: 
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=
 (3) 
where LMpt05 indicates whether an investment was made or land management practice was used between 
2000 and 2005; LM*pt05 is an index function determining the demand for making land investments or 
using land management practices; Tpt05, Xpt0, GNRHLpt05 and Zht0 are as defined in equation (2); γ0, γT, γX, 
γG, and γZ are vectors of parameters to be estimated; and u
LM
pt05 is an error term assumed to be normal 
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. Maximum likelihood estimation of equation (3) results 
in a probit model. As in estimating equation (2), we included village-level fixed effects when the model 
was estimable with fixed effects, and we tested for the significance of the fixed effects. We also tested the 
exogeneity of the HKm status variables using the method of Smith and Blundell (1986) and failed to 
reject exogeneity in all cases.  42 




Land Clearing  Sediment Pits Terraces  Fertilizer  Compost 
Mean  Std. 
error  Mean  Std. 
error  Mean  Std. 
error  Mean  Std. 
error  Mean  Std. 
error 
National  park  80  0.0500 0.0245  0.0625 0.0272  0.0375 0.0214  0.4625 0.0561  0.1500 0.0402 
Private  80  0.0250 0.0176  0.2125 0.0460  0.0750 0.0296  0.5250 0.0562  0.1750 0.0427 
HKm  permit,  with  past  eviction  80  0.1625 0.0415  0.1625 0.0415  0.1250 0.0372  0.6500 0.0537  0.0625 0.0272 
HKm  permit,  without  past  eviction  80  0.0625 0.0272  0.0750 0.0296  0.0625 0.0272  0.1750 0.0427  0.0250 0.0176 
HKm  application  pending,  with  past  eviction 80  0.1625 0.0415  0.1125 0.0356  0.0375 0.0214  0.3500 0.0537  0.0500 0.0245 
HKm application pending, without past 
eviction  80  0.1875 0.0439  0.0250 0.0176  0.0000 0.0000  0.3125 0.0521  0.0125 0.0125 
PF  land  without  HKm,  with  past  eviction  80  0.0375 0.0214  0.0625 0.0272  0.0500 0.0245  0.4500 0.0560  0.0625 0.0272 
PF land without HKm, without past eviction  80  0.0875  0.0318  0.0625  0.0272  0.0125  0.0125  0.2500  0.0487  0.0625  0.0272 
                  
All  plots  640  0.0600 0.0121  0.1533 0.0270  0.0585 0.0175  0.4720 0.0342  0.1371 0.0255 




The results of the probit models for land investments and land management practices are presented in 
Table 10. The table does not include regressions for determinants of land clearing or terrace investment 
because of the small number of positive observations of those variables, causing unreliable results of the 
probit model. We found that use of compost is less common on PF plots with HKm permits, HKm 
applications pending, or no HKm applications than on NP or private plots. This finding shows that tenure 
security is more favorable on NP plots than we originally expected, consistent with earlier results on land 
values and tree planting. 
As expected, past evictions have a negative impact on all types of land investment and 
management practices, although the coefficient is highly significant only for compost. On plots where 
GNRHL reforestation efforts have been approved, use of compost is less common. Such reforestation 
efforts may conflict with the use of organic practices. 
Other factors significantly affecting some land management practices include means of plot 
acquisition, household wealth, ethnicity, human capital, gender composition, social capital, access to 
technical assistance, land quality, and initial stock of trees on the plot. As for tree planting, we do not 
discuss the impacts of these other factors in detail. 
Table 10. Determinants of land investments and land management practices, 2000–2005 (probit 
regression results) 
Explanatory Variable 
Sediment Pits  Fertilizer  Compost 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error 
Land tenure variables          
Land tenure and HKm status (cf., 
national park land)          
-  Private  0.84 (0.85)  0.141 (0.43)  -0.091 (0.98) 
-  HKm  permit  0.29 (1.09)  -0.352 (0.57)  -2.422*** (0.62) 
-  HKm  application  pending  0.32 (0.96)  0.024 (0.41)  -2.900*** (1.68) 
-  No  HKm  0.94 (0.90)  0.281 (0.47)  -2.682*** (0.89) 
Past  evictions          
-  Whether  occurred  -0.98* (0.54) -0.689* (0.40)  -10.537*** (0.87) 
-  Trees  uprooted  0.78 (0.74)  0.195 (0.47)  9.147 (1.13) 
How plot acquired (cf., encroached)          
-  Inherited  0.4 (0.45)  0.277 (0.28)  -0.614  (.) 
-  Purchased  -0.2 (0.31) 0.414** (0.21)  1.336*** (0.66) 
-  Sharecropped  -5.79*** (1.18)  0.495 (0.39)  NE   
-  Exchanged  2.73*** (0.83)  -0.034 (0.82)  0.771 (0.51) 
Plot characteristics          
Area  (ha)  0.04 (0.25) 0.295** (0.14)  0.397 (0.01) 
Soil color (cf., black)             
-  Yellow  1.01** (0.48)  -0.177 (0.28)  -2.140*** (0.72) 
-  Red  -0.19 (0.40)  -0.157 (0.25)  -4.011*** (0.64) 
-  Brown  1.50*** (0.47)  -0.666*** (0.25)  -0.984** (0.46) 
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Table 10. Continued 
Explanatory Variable 
Sediment Pits  Fertilizer  Compost 
Coefficient Std.  error  Coefficient  Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Soil texture (cf., loam)             
- Clay  -0.42  (0.33)  0.720***  (0.21)  1.446***  (0.40) 
- Sandy  -0.47  (0.43)  -0.074  (0.25)  0.489  (0.67) 
Altitude (m)  0.00  0.00  -0.002*  (0.00)  0.005**  (0.00) 
Slope (%)  -0.01  (0.01)  -0.010**  (0.01)  -0.006  (0.01) 
Soil depth (cm)  0.04*  (0.03)  0  (0.02)  0.061*  (0.03) 
Position on slope (cf., bottom)             
- Top  -0.11  (0.43)  0.379  (0.24)  2.356***  (0.56) 
- Middle  -0.81**  (0.39)  0.245  (0.22)  2.915***  (0.49) 
- Top/middle/bottom  1.49**  (0.69)  0.23  (0.47)  2.688***   
Fallow/shrub in 2000  -0.19  (0.47)  -0.189  (0.29)  -2.249**  (1.05) 
Stock of trees in 2000             
- Timber  0  0.00  0  (0.00)  -0.007*  (0.92) 
- Multipurpose  0.00**  0.00  0.001  (0.00)  0.005***  (0.00) 
-  Shade  -0.00*  0.00  0.000*** 0.00  0.001*** 0.00 
-  Coffee  0  0.00  0 0.00  -0.000** 0.00 
Plot cleared in 2000  -0.33  (1.05)  -0.838  (0.55)  NE  NE 
Walking time from residence  0  0.00  0.002  (0.00)  0  (0.75) 
Walking time from road  0  (0.01)  0.002  (0.00)  -0.016***  (0.00) 
GNRHL 0.55  (0.36)  0.257  (0.25)  -3.318***  (0.28) 
Household characteristics           
Value of assets in 2000 (millions of 
Rupiah)           
- Rice land  -0.04**  (0.02)  -0.005  (0.00)  -0.021*  (0.65) 
- Coffee land  -0.01  (0.01)  0.001  (0.00)  0.018***  (0.01) 
- Other land  0.02  (0.02)  0.015  (0.02)  0.025  (0.01) 
- Livestock  -0.44***  (0.10)  -0.012  (0.06)  0.027  (0.23) 
- Farm equipment  0.72***  (0.17)  -0.183  (0.15)  0.687***  (0.02) 
- Transport equipment  0  (0.05)  -0.011  (0.02)  -0.116**  (0.13) 
- Buildings  -0.01  (0.01)  0.003  (0.00)  0.013**  (0.05) 
Ethnicity  (cf.,  Sumendo)           
- Javanese  -0.18  (0.48)  -0.115  (0.26)  0.387  (0.91) 
- Sundanese  -1.10**  (0.46)  0.246  (0.27)  -2.418***  (0.60) 
Age of household head  0.02  (0.01)  0.004  (0.01)  0.048**  (0.64) 
Dependency ratio  1.69*  (0.93)  -0.433  (0.52)  -0.615  (0.02) 
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Table 10. Continued 
Explanatory Variable 
Sediment Pits  Fertilizer  Compost 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient  Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Schooling of males  -0.20***  (0.06)  0.013  (0.03)  -0.015  (1.49) 
Schooling of females  0.08  (0.06)  0.058*  (0.03)  0.164**  (0.09) 
Occupation nonagricultural  0.19  (0.71)  2.228***  (0.61)  0.456  (0.06) 
Male head of household      0.457  (0.53)  2.029**  (1.06) 
Female share of labor  -0.01  (0.01)  -0.001  (0.01)  0.037**  (0.93) 
Family size  -0.1  (0.13)  -0.123  (0.09)  -0.044  (0.02) 
Years settled in village  -0.01  (0.01)  -0.015*  (0.01)  -0.076***  (0.21) 
Membership in groups             
- Coffee producers’ group  -0.71  (0.76)  0.472  (0.46)  -2.055**  (0.02) 
- Labor-sharing group  -1.31  (0.81)  0.004  (0.37)  -0.994  (1.01) 
Distance to output market  -0.09  (0.06)  0.006  (0.03)  0.021  (0.01) 
Access to credit  0.54  (0.37)  0.279  (0.19)  0.045  (0.06) 
Access to technical assistance             
- ICRAF  4.14***  (0.93)  -0.035  (0.43)  -2.921  (0.51) 
- Forest Department  0.01  (0.33)  -0.418  (0.25)  1.367**  (1.99) 
- Agriculture Department  -0.07  (0.46)  -0.619*  (0.33)  -0.088  (0.61) 
Intercept 2.86  (2.74)  1.293  (1.59)  -11.168***  (3.20) 
          
N  607   607   607  
Number of plots with practice  62    254    48   
Joint significance of village-level 
fixed effects  0.000***   0.000***   0.000***  
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of 
HKm status variables (p level)  0.2889   0.3764   0.1124  
1 Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for probability weights and stratification of sample, and standard errors computed 
using White’s robust estimator. Village-level fixed effects not estimated in land clearing and terraces regressions. Fixed effects 
coefficients not reported to save space. 
ICRAF = World Agroforestry Centre. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Propensity Score Matching Results 
We also investigated differences in land investments and management practices among various categories 
of PF plots using PSM, and the results are presented in Table 11. Consistent with the econometric results, 
we did not find any statistically significant differences in land investment or management on plots having 
different HKm statuses.  46 
 




Sediment Pits  Fertilizer  Compost 
Mean Std.  error
2  N
3  Mean Std.  error
2  N
3  Mean Std.  error
2  N
3 
HKm permit –  
HKm application in process 
0.084 0.055 300  0.105 0.128 300  0.032 0.029  300 
HKm permit –  
PF land without HKm 
0.063 0.057 281  0.095 0.152 281  -0.032 0.089  281 
HKm application in process – 
PF land without HKm 
-0.076 0.054 290  -0.017 0.125 290  -0.068 0.057  290 
1 Matching procedure: kernel matching with replacement, using the normal kernel.  
2 Standard errors computed using bootstrapping. 
3 Number of matched observations based on a requirement of common support of the treatment and control observation by 
dropping any treatment observation with a propensity score higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score 
of the controls. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Impacts on Profitability of Land Management 
Almost all HKm groups we surveyed in the Sumberjaya watershed said they expected participation in 
HKm to increase their incomes (Figure 10). This is consistent with the expectations reported in the 
household survey by individual operators of HKm plots and PF plots with HKm applications pending, 
most of whom expected their incomes from the plots to increase as a result of the HKm program (Figure 
11). A substantial fraction of those operators expected a large increase (more than 10 percent) in plot 
income. Respondents in the community survey (Kerr et al. 2006) said they expected income to increase 
with participation in HKm because they would cultivate more intensively and plant more coffee and fruit 
trees under the program. Some respondents further explained that increased tenure security would make 
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Descriptive statistics on the mean profits per hectare from plots of various tenure and HKm 
statuses are somewhat, but not fully, consistent with those perceptions (Table 12). Mean profits from 
private plots are higher than those from other plots, followed by NP plots, plots with HKm applications 
pending, plots with HKm permits, and PF plots without HKm permits. Next we tested for differences 
between profits on plots of different tenures and HKm statuses, controlling for other factors, using 
econometrics. 
Table 12. Profits on plots of varying tenures and HKm status in 2005 (thousands of Rupiah/ha). 
Land Tenure/HKm Category  Mean Standard  Error 
National park  1,019.6  114.7 
Private 1,968.8  201.4 
HKm permit  767.6  145.0 
HKm application pending  991.9  110.7 
PF land without HKm  405.0  89.3 
 
Econometric Model for Profits per Hectare 
The econometric model for determinants of profits per hectare uses a very similar specification to 
equations (2) and (3): 
  0 pt T pt X pt G pt Z ht pt TXG N R H LZ u
π πφ φ φ φ φ =+ + + + +  (4) 
where πpt is the profit per hectare on plot p in year t (2005 in the regression); Tpt is a vector of tenure 
characteristics of the plot; Xpt is a vector of quality and other characteristics of the plot; GNRHLpt is the 
access of the plot to reforestation assistance under the GNRHL program; Zht is a vector of household 
characteristics; φ0, φT, φX, φG, and φZ are vectors of parameters to be estimated; and u
π
pt is an error term 
with zero mean. The vectors of explanatory variables are very similar to those used in equations (2) and 
(3), except that in equation (4) we used values of assets and other time-varying explanatory variables in 
2005, rather than 2000. Two additional variables are included in the vector of plot-level variables (Xpt) 
that were not included in earlier specifications (because they were unavailable for the earlier period): the 
percentage of organic carbon in the topsoil, which was measured using soil laboratory analysis, and the 
average age of coffee trees on the plot in 2005. We expected both variables to have a positive impact on 
the profitability of coffee and other tree crop production. 
We estimated the model using three specifications: (1) ordinary least squares with village-level 
fixed effects (OLS-FE), (2) median regression with village-level fixed effects (median-FE), and (3) 
instrumental variables regression without village-level fixed effects (IV–no FE). We estimated the median 
regression with fixed effects because of concerns about outliers of the dependent variable (e.g., a 
substantial proportion of negative values) that might undermine the robustness of the results of OLS 
estimation. We estimated the IV model because of concerns about possible endogeneity of the HKm 
status variables, and we used this model to test the exogeneity of those variables. As in earlier IV 
regressions, the IV model was not estimable with fixed effects because the excluded instrumental 
variables used for identification are village-level variables. 49 
 
Econometric Results 
The results of the econometric models for determinants of profits per hectare are reported in Table 13. As 
in previous sections, our results support the validity and relevance of the excluded instrumental variables 
used to estimate the IV model, and support the exogeneity of the HKm permit and HKm application 
variables. Thus, OLS is preferred to IV estimation as the more efficient model, and we do not refer to the 
IV results in our subsequent discussion.  
The results of the OLS-FE and median-FE models show statistically insignificant impacts of 
HKm status on profits per hectare, controlling for other factors. In general, land tenure variables have 
limited direct impacts on profitability in these regressions. 
Although land tenure and HKm status have limited direct impacts on profitability, those variables 
may have indirect impacts by influencing tree planting and other land investments, as demonstrated in 
previous subsections. In both the OLS and median regressions, we found that the stock of multipurpose 
trees has a positive impact on profits. Because we found earlier that HKm contributes to planting of 
multipurpose trees, this provides evidence of indirect positive impacts of HKm on profitability. 
According to the PSM results in Table 8, an HKm permit results in households planting an estimated 473 
more multipurpose trees per hectare than on comparable plots without HKm permits. Based on the OLS 
coefficient estimates shown in Table 13, the additional trees increase profits by an estimated 1,270 
Rupiah per additional tree (1,120 Rupiah per tree in the median regression), so the estimated additional 
profit resulting from additional multipurpose trees as a result of an HKm permit is about 600,000 Rupiah 
per hectare (530,000 Rupiah per hectare using the median regression results). This represents a significant 
increase in farmers’ incomes resulting from an HKm permit. 
Because the HKm program also promotes increased planting of timber trees, and those trees were 
found to have a negative impact on profit in the OLS regression (–1,320 Rupiah per timber tree), the 
negative impacts may offset the positive profit impact of HKm through its effects on multipurpose tree 
planting. The negative impact of timber planting on profitability is reasonable to expect, given that timber 
trees can have negative impacts on coffee production by competing for light, water, and nutrients and 
because farmers are not allowed to harvest timber products on HKm land. However, we are less confident 
of the negative impact of timber tree planting on profits because this coefficient is statistically 
insignificant in the median regression. 
Other factors that have robust effects on profits in both the OLS and median regressions include 
the value of farm equipment (+), buildings (+ but quantitatively very small), age of household head (–), 
membership in a coffee producers’ group (+), membership in a labor-sharing group (–), and access to 
formal credit (+). Other factors having statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) impacts in at least 
one of the regressions include altitude of the plot (– in OLS regression), the share of organic carbon in the 
topsoil (+ in OLS), whether the plot was fallow in 2005 (– in median regression), the value of coffee land 
owned (+ in OLS), education of males (+ in OLS), the number of years the household had been settled in 
the village (+ in OLS), and access to technical assistance from the Agriculture Department (+ in OLS). 
These results indicate that farmers’ access to physical, human, and natural capital; participation in coffee 
producers’ organizations; and access to formal credit and technical assistance from the Agriculture 
Department contribute to higher profitability on coffee-agroforestry plots, while participation in labor-
sharing groups is associated with lower profitability. The negative impact of participation in labor-sharing 
groups may reflect higher opportunity costs of labor for such households, which might limit the labor 
intensity of their management of coffee-agroforestry plots. 50 
 
Table 13. Determinants of profits




2  IV–No FE 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Land tenure variables          
Land tenure and HKm status (cf., national park land)         
-  Private  506.62 (346.83)  546.48 (402.49)  113.83 (348.05) 
-  HKm  permit  392.94 (480.51)  53.32 (458.97)  -229.97 (337.20) 
-  HKm  application  pending  277.54 (341.78)  26.78 (373.33)  -185.52 (326.23) 
-  No  HKm  99.03 (370.49)  -575.33 (358.87)  -596.94* (311.72) 
Past  evictions          
-  Whether  evicted  40.74 (226.12)  -26.88 (246.85)  68.45 (207.92) 
-  Whether  trees  uprooted  443.96 (366.06)  -12.6 (394.02)  79.3 (286.02) 
How plot acquired (cf.,  encroached)       
-  Inherited  -316.23 (256.52)  -255.06 (214.80)  168.04 (200.94) 
-  Purchased  -316.53* (190.89)  -290.06 (195.75)  95.08 (141.70) 
-  Sharecropped  -200.59 (253.60)  -276.07 (184.13)  125.88 (220.15) 
-  Exchanged  1040.48** (516.22)  562.61 (471.93) 983.17*** (314.14) 
Plot characteristics          
Area  (ha.)  15.29  (105.36)  28.77 (67.07)  -19.1 (64.15) 
Soil  color  (cf.,  black)          
-  Yellow  -223.58 (200.86)  21.57 (181.90)  8.37 (175.86) 
-  Red  124.32 (157.27)  -101.06 (149.49)  -26.28 (149.99) 
-  Brown  -150.1 (189.76)  -3.71 (241.28)  50.34 (130.51) 
Soil  texture  (cf.,  loam)          
-  Clay  250.97 (184.84)  198.37 (136.62)  248.05** (118.10) 
-  Sand  437.15* (224.66)  29.5 (370.76)  -331.11* (201.09) 
Altitude (m)  -2.70**  (1.05)  -0.27 (0.91)  -0.4 (0.56) 
Average  slope  (%)  -2.3 (3.33)  0.94 (3.55)  -1.56 (2.61) 
Position on slope (cf., bottom)             
-  Top  215.89 (220.41)  34.86 (217.66)  123.91 (170.05) 
-  Middle  241.47 (187.31)  -161.89 (179.30)  12.56 (140.37) 
-  Top/middle/bottom  131.11 (339.22)  -29.63 (354.94)  551.93 (346.21) 
Topsoil depth (cm)  21.54  (14.89)  -11.82  (9.21)  10.59  (9.16) 
Organic carbon in topsoil in 
2005 (%)  150.59** (65.32)  39.08 (59.55)  59.34 (43.83) 
Fallow/shrub  land  in  2005  -237.95 (366.60)  -460.64** (208.03)  -631.26*** (179.85) 
Stock of trees in 2005 (no./ha)             
-  Timber  -1.32*** (0.50)  -0.85 (0.68)  -0.06 (0.42) 
-  Multipurpose  1.27*** (0.47) 1.12*** (0.41)  0.62 (0.38) 
-  Coffee  -0.06 (0.14)  0.16 (0.12)  0.14 (0.09) 
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2  IV–No FE 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
-  Shade  0.12 (0.32)  0.09 (0.21)  0.66** (0.27) 
Average age of coffee trees (yrs)  10.12  (8.41)  14.88*  (7.58)  28.08***  (6.55) 
SWC  investments  on  plot    2.13 (181.52)  48.02 (149.92)  -73.04 (133.25) 
Walking time from residence  -2.29  (1.72)  0.81  (2.48)  2.93  (1.92) 
Walking time from home  -2.19  (1.71)  -1.91  (2.01)  -3.80**  (1.52) 
GNRHL    13.32 (224.86)  2.49 (221.01)  -137.37 (151.47) 
Household characteristics          
Value of assets in 2005 (millions 
of Rupiah)          
-  Rice  land  4.33 (2.67)  8.50* (4.74) 9.53*** (2.23) 
-  Coffee  land  7.25*** (2.66)  1.39 (2.74)  2.86 (2.07) 
-  Other  land  3.16 (6.79)  -3.04 (5.94)  -8.46** (3.43) 
-  Livestock  -28.89 (55.24)  -44.28 (52.79)  -44.64** (20.98) 
- Farm equipment  274.32**  (110.87)  178.02*  (104.63)  119.9  (79.15) 
- Transportation equipment  -14.89  (14.80)  5.67  (11.46)  3  (9.55) 
-  Buildings  0.00* 0.00  0.00* 0.00  0 0.00 
Ethnicity  (cf.,  Sumendo)          
-  Javanese  356.73* (181.92)  218.65 (152.23)  48.15 (145.35) 
-  Sundanese  -354.93 (219.76)  85.29 (174.55)  26.7 (146.28) 
Age  of  household  head  -26.21*** (7.70)  -14.26** (7.16)  -2.45 (5.49) 
Dependency  ratio  -243.83 (344.99)  206.39 (318.46)  79.79 (315.32) 
Schooling  of  males  87.43*** (29.02)  38.04 (27.11) 76.97*** (20.95) 
Schooling  of  females  46.24 (33.66)  15.77 (29.45)  32.52 (20.92) 
Occupation  nonagricultural  -296.67 (443.37)  497.26 (807.67)  345.28 (318.52) 
Male  head  of  household  515.41 (407.98)  -358.08 (780.19)  -343.84 (444.86) 
Female  share  of  labor  -1.32 (4.15)  0.85 (3.33)  1.37 (3.45) 
Family  size  -4.3 (52.06)  -49.41 (55.58)  -69.3 (43.66) 
Years  settled  in  village  16.54*** (4.79)  -1.17 (5.40)  0.84 (4.24) 
Membership  in  groups          
- Coffee producers’ group  1028.90***  (365.05)  913.91*  (536.59)  1550.71**  (611.96) 
-  Labor-sharing  group  -546.91** (238.49)  -339.89* (186.53)  -18.78 (202.87) 
Distance to output market (km)  -9.24  (17.98)  -10.32  (22.36)  5.53  (18.90) 
Access  to  formal  credit  382.25** (152.49)  312.52** (127.93)  197.95* (119.46) 
Access to technical assistance             
-  ICRAF  469.99 (364.09)  256.83 (302.10)  187.7 (339.78) 
-  Forest  Department  -43.24 (210.66)  -49.03 (187.74)  154.9 (164.32) 
-  Agriculture  Department  642.20** (284.22)  263.02 (263.18)  -90.75 (226.53) 
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2  IV–No FE 
Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept  2440.45* (1372.55)  3163.28 (2030.20)  -200.06  (981.34) 
N  547   547   373  
R
2  0.649   0.273   0.476  
Joint significance test of village 
dummies (p value)  0.000***   0.000***     
Hansen’s J test of overid. 
restrictions (p value)        0.110  
C-test of exogeneity of HKm (p 
value)        0.476  
Relevancy test of excluded 
instruments (p value): 
-HKm with permit 
-HKm in process 




1 Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for probability weights and stratification of sample, and standard errors computed 
using White’s robust estimator. 
2 The village-level fixed effects coefficients are not reported to save space. 
FE = village-level fixed effects; IV = instrumental variables; OLS = ordinary least squares. 
ICRAF = World Agroforestry Centre. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Propensity Score Matching Results 
The results of comparisons of profitability on PF plots with HKm permits, with HKm applications 
pending, and without HKm applications using PSM are presented in Table 14. We found no significant 
difference in profitability between HKm permit plots and similar plots with HKm applications pending or 
PF plots without HKm applications, but we did find significantly higher profits on plots with HKm 
applications pending than on PF plots without HKm applications.  
Table 14. Comparison of profits per hectare between PF plots of varying HKm status using PSM
1. 
Comparison Mean  Standard  Error2 
Number of 
Observations3 
HKm permit –  
HKm application in process 
-326.1 382.0  270 
HKm permit –  
PF land without HKm 
-124.1 463.9  241 
HKm application in process – 
PF land without HKm 
589.5** 292.2  249 
1 Matching procedure: kernel matching with replacement, using the normal kernel. Comparison of HKm permit plots and PF land 
without HKm resulted in inability to estimate the model in most bootstrap replications, so this comparison was dropped. 
2 Standard errors computed using bootstrapping. 
3 Number of matched observations based on a requirement of common support of the treatment and control observation by 
dropping any treatment observation with a propensity score higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score 
of the controls. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 53 
 
The insignificant differences between plots with HKm permits and other PF plots are consistent 
with the insignificant direct impacts of HKm status shown in Table 13. However, as noted in the previous 
subsection, an HKm permit should indirectly increase profitability by promoting planting of multipurpose 
trees. Because the PSM model controls for differences in stocks of trees and other factors as of the year 
2000 but allows for subsequent differences in tree planting to affect profitability, the estimates in the PSM 
model reflect the indirect impact of HKm on profitability by its impact on tree planting after 2000. Our 
inability to find a significant difference between plots with HKm permits and PF plots without HKm 
permits in the PSM analysis may have resulted from the fact that timber tree planting, which is also 
promoted by HKm, appears to reduce profitability, as noted previously. Thus, the positive profitability 
impacts of HKm permits via the impact on planting multipurpose trees may be offset by the impact on 
planting timber trees. That the process of applying for an HKm permit has a smaller impact on farmers’ 
decisions to plant timber trees than it does on planting multipurpose trees (see Tables 6 and 8) may 
explain why we found higher profits on plots with HKm applications in process, as shown in Table 14. As 
with HKm permit plots, more multipurpose trees have been planted on plots with HKm applications in 
process, contributing to higher profitability, whereas less timber planting has occurred on those plots than 
on plots with HKm permits, with smaller offsetting negative impacts on profitability. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Several key findings have emerged from our analysis of participation in, and impacts of, the HKm 
program in Sumberjaya: 
•  Operators of plots with an HKm permit or HKm application pending are poorer on average 
than owners of private land, but have comparable wealth to users of PF land who have not 
applied for HKm permits and users of NP land. Thus, HKm appears to benefit poorer 
households because of the nature of the households that use eligible PF land and not because 
of any targeting in the implementation of the program. 
•  Households with HKm permits have more formal education, have been settled somewhat 
longer in the village, are more likely to be involved in a coffee producers’ group or labor-
sharing group, and have better access to markets, roads, and technical assistance from the 
Forest Department, ICRAF, or NGOs compared with operators of PF plots who have not 
applied for permits. Several of these differences (differences in education, membership in 
groups, and access to technical assistance) were confirmed as statistically significant in the 
econometric analysis, after controlling for other factors. Thus, human and social capital and 
access to technical assistance appear to contribute to the ability of households to participate in 
the HKm program. 
•  A significant fraction of members of HKm groups are not aware of the HKm program or the 
program’s requirements concerning the composition of trees to plant with coffee plantations 
or soil and water conservation measures. Awareness is higher among members of groups that 
have received HKm permits than those that have applied but not yet received permits, 
suggesting that awareness improves in the process of obtaining the permit or after. 
Nevertheless, imperfect awareness among even permit holders may limit the impacts of the 
program. 
•  HKm groups and households believe that participation in the HKm program will substantially 
increase their land tenure security, land values, land investments, and incomes. Statistical 
analysis of the data suggests more modest but some positive impacts of the program. We did 
not find significant evidence that the program has contributed to higher land values or 
increased investment in soil and water conservation or soil fertility management measures. 
However, we did find that HKm permits contribute to increased planting of timber and 
multipurpose trees. This has mixed impacts on profitability of land use, because multipurpose 
trees have a positive impact but timber trees have a negative impact on profits, resulting in 
insignificant differences in profits on HKm permit plots compared with comparable PF plots 
without HKm permits. Planting of multipurpose trees is also higher on plots with HKm 
applications pending, whereas timber tree planting is less affected by the application process. 
Possibly as a result, plots with HKm permits have higher profits than do PF plots without 
HKm permits. 
These findings indicate that the HKm program is having positive impacts on planting of 
noncoffee trees by HKm permit holders and is contributing in a limited way to improving their incomes. 
Our finding that the holders of HKm permits are poorer on average than holders of private land suggests 
that the program is having pro-poor impacts, although it is not specifically targeted to poorer households. 
HKm permit holders tend to have more human and social capital and better access to certain forms of 
technical assistance than users of PF land who have not applied for permits. This finding suggests that the 
program could benefit more poor households through increased efforts to provide technical assistance and 
promote social capital formation among eligible communities and households that are presently not 55 
 
participating. Increased efforts to raise awareness about the program and its requirements, for HKm 
permit holders as well as for others, would also increase the effectiveness and benefits of the program. 
Other research by ICRAF and others has shown that planting timber and multipurpose trees 
provides environmental benefits. For example, multistrata coffee farms provide a complex canopy that 
protects the soil surface from heavy raindrops that cause erosion. The system creates tree litter on the 
garden floors that also helps weaken the erosion force of water (Hairiah et al. 2005; Van Noordwijk et al. 
2004). Our finding that the HKm program has contributed to planting such multistrata agroforestry 
systems indicates that the program is achieving its objective of promoting provision of such 
environmental services, at least in the near term.  
The findings of this study indicate generally favorable, though not overwhelming, impacts of the 
HKm program in the Sumberjaya watershed. The program is seen to be pro-poor and to provide some 
environmental services, suggesting the possibility of both reducing poverty and providing environmental 
services. This provides empirical support for continuing and expanding the program. At the same time, 
our findings suggest that implementation of the program could be improved through increased technical 
assistance to make it more accessible to eligible households that are not yet participating, and to increase 
awareness and understanding of the nature and requirements of the program. It is also advisable for the 
Forest Department to consider allowing HKm groups to harvest timber in a sustainable manner (with 
rotational replanting) from HKm areas, because the negative impact of timber planting on profitability 
may otherwise undermine compliance with the program as well as its potential to contribute to poverty 
reduction. 
Our study is subject to important limitations that limit our ability to draw more definitive policy 
recommendations regarding the HKm program. First, this study was conducted in only one watershed. 
The results in this watershed may not be representative of the impacts occurring in other locations 
because of differences in ways the program is being implemented, in returns to compliance versus 
noncompliance, in local community cohesion and social capital, in access to appropriate technical 
assistance, and in other critical factors across different contexts. Second, we were not able to investigate 
the spillover effects of the program onto neighboring areas. For example, increased protection of forests 
in areas where HKm permits are functioning well may cause people to deforest other nearby forest areas. 
Further research on the impacts of HKm in other contexts is needed to address those issues. 
Intertemporal spillovers could also occur. The prospect of receiving future secure-tenure permits 
to plant coffee in deforested state forestland could encourage people to clear forest in hopes of acquiring 
such rights. It is also not clear what will happen in the longer term after HKm groups receive longer-term 
HKm permits. Since this study was completed, several HKm groups in Sumberjaya watershed were 
granted definitive (25-year) permits. It remains to be seen whether those groups will continue to comply 
with program requirements. Once they feel assured of their tenure security, they may have less incentive 
to plant or preserve noncoffee trees in coffee plots unless such trees contribute to income. This problem is 
particularly likely to be of concern for management of timber trees, unless farmers are allowed to 
periodically harvest timber trees or tree planting and protection requirements are strictly enforced. Since 
multipurpose trees appear to be profitable, there will be less need to enforce requirements to maintain 
those trees after they have been planted. On the more positive side, as HKm groups become more assured 
of their tenure security, they may be more likely to make other land investments, the value of their land 
assets will be more likely to increase, and they are likely to be less subject to payment of bribes. Further 
research in Sumberjaya as well as other contexts, building on this study, would be useful to address such 
intertemporal issues. 56 
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